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The benefits provided to states by federal unemployment compensation
law are conditioned on meeting several requirements. This Article
examines some of these requirements, how they came about, how the
United States Department of Labor and the federal courts have inter-
preted them, and how conflicts between the states and the federal
government have been resolved. The Article concludes that certain
types of requirements work best within this federal-state system.
INTRODUCTION
The unemployment compensation (UC) system is a federal-
state partnership based upon federal law but executed through
state laws and by state employees: federal law defines require-
ments for the system while each state designs its own UC
system within these requirements.' Since the creation of the
UC system in 1935,2 the desirability of federal requirements
has been a subject of debate among experts in the field.3 This
* Chief, Legislative Review and Guidance Group, Unemployment Insurance
Service, Employment & TrainingAdministration, United States Department of Labor.
B.A. 1975, University of Wisconsin-Madison. The views expressed in this Article are
the author's and not necessarily those of the United States Department of Labor. The
author extends his thanks to his colleagues at the Department who have offered
encouragement and assistance during the writing of this Article.
1. DrvISION OF LEGISLATION, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION:
FEDERAL-STATE PARTNERSHIP 1-2 (1995) [hereinafter FEDERAL-STATE PARTNERSHIP].
2. The system was established by the Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, 49
Stat. 620 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-506 (1994)). The taxing provisions
were transferred to the Internal Revenue Code by the Social Security Act Amend-
ments of 1939, ch. 666, tit. VI, 53 Stat. 1360, 1381 (current version at 26 U.S.C.
§§ 3301-3310 (1994)).
3. See, e.g., SAUL J. BLAUSTEIN, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN THE UNITED
STATES 211-64 (1993) (providing a history of 1965-1966 legislative efforts as well as
a history of enactments through 1993); WILLIAM HABER & MERRILL G. MURRAY,
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 330-57, 441-46 (1966)
(discussing the effectiveness of experience-rating requirements); NATIONAL COMM'N
ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION: FINAL REPORT
3 (1980) [hereinafter NCUC REPORT] (recommending various reforms); MURRAY
RUBIN, FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 37-121 (1983)
(discussing existing federal requirements and their desirability).
528 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 29:1&2
debate will continue, as will attempts to add, delete, or amend
the requirements.'
Consideration of what is a desirable federal law requirement
may benefit from an understanding of what has happened to
some federal law requirements following their enactment. To
this end, this Article examines federal law requirements to see
how the United States Department of Labor (USDOL) has
interpreted and applied them, how the courts have ruled on
them, and how Congress occasionally has revisited them.
Part I provides a brief discussion of the federal-state rela-
tionship and how it works and then reviews how the USDOL
has interpreted and applied several federal law requirements.
The Article then divides the discussion of federal requirements
into three basic types: Part II considers the "methods of ad-
ministration" requirement, which provides the USDOL with
the flexibility to establish almost any administrative require-
ment it chooses; Part III considers minimum requirements,
which provide the states considerable flexibility; and Part IV
considers absolute requirements, which, at least in theory,
give no flexibility to either the USDOL or the states. Part IV
also examines how the USDOL negotiated two recent conflicts
with federal law without resorting to litigation to illustrate
how conflicts are resolved by the USDOL as well as to intro-
duce some problems concerning conflict resolution. The Article
concludes that (1) the USDOL attempts to interpret federal
law in such a way to leave discretion to the states while
reasonably effectuating the statute; (2) although the USDOL
regularly raises issues with problems in state law, the atten-
dant performance issues are frequently left unresolved; and (3)
the requirements that work best within the federal-state UC
system are those creating minimum standards that call for
specific criteria in state law.
4. See, e.g., Maribeth Wilt-Seibert, Unemployment Compensation for Employees
of Educational Institutions: How State Courts Have Created Variations on Federally
Mandated Statutory Language, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 585 (1996). The Advisory
Council on Unemployment Compensation has considered federal requirements in
three reports to the President. See ADVISORY COUNCIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSA-
TION, DEFINING FEDERAL AND STATE ROLES IN UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE (1996);
ADVISORY COUNCIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
IN THE UNITED STATES: BENEFITS, FINANCING, COVERAGE (1995); ADVISORY COUNCIL
ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1994).
Federal Law Requirements
This Article deals with only a few federal law requirements
and, in some cases, only a few aspects of these requirements.5
This Article may invite questions as to whether some of these
requirements are appropriate for the federal-state relation-
ship, whether they are desirable as public policy, and whether
the USDOL's interpretations have always been optimal. These
questions are not within this Article's scope, although it has
been necessary to outline briefly why Congress thought it
necessary to establish the requirements.
I. BACKGROUND: THE FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONSHIP
When Congress first considered unemployment insurance,
there was considerable debate concerning what type of UC
system should be created.' Three options were discussed: leave
the matter entirely to the states, create a totally federal
system, or develop a federal-state system.8 In the end the
current federal-state system was chosen for the following
reasons:
1. "[An exclusively Federal system would be cumbersome
and would result in centralization of administrative
functions and bureaucratic methods which might para-
lyze action."9
2. The federal government "would assume the leadership
by removing the disadvantages in interstate competition
that are always raised against purely State legislation
involving costs to industry" ° while allowing wide lati-
tude for experimentation which would provide "unifor-
mity where essential and diversity where necessary."11
3. A purely federal system "would necessitate decisions at
the very outset on all points which could not be left to
5. One of the requirements not discussed here, experience rating, is discussed
in a somewhat similar context by Theodore D. Wagman in The Mythology of Experi-
ence Rating in Unemployment Compensation, 59 U. DET. J. URB. L. 631 (1982).
6. UC is also known as unemployment insurance.
7. See SOCIAL SEC. BD., SOCIAL SECURITY IN AMERICA 91-95 (1937).
8. RUBIN, supra note 3, at 11-12.
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administrative discretion."'2 As a result, mistakes in a
federal plan would have wider repercussions than mis-
takes under a federal-state plan.'3
Dr. Edwin Witte, who was deeply involved with the creation
of the program, 4 provided more pragmatic reasons. For ex-
ample, he explained that President Franklin D. Roosevelt
"expressed decided preferences for state administration of
unemployment insurance" but felt that the funds used to pay
UC benefits "must be handled by the federal government." 5
Further, a federal-state system would be more likely to sur-
vive a constitutional challenge.' 6
Under the federal-state system, the states must meet two
basic sets of requirements. 7 The first set must be met for
employers in a state to receive credit against the federal
unemployment tax.'8 Currently, employers receiving the full
credit may have their federal unemployment tax reduced from
6.2% percent of wages to 0.8%."9 A second set of requirements
12. Id. at 94.
13. Id.
14. Dr. Witte was Executive Director of the Committee on Economic Security
created by President Roosevelt. HABER & MURRAY, supra note 3, at 77.
15. Id. at 78 (quoting EDWIN E. WITTE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIAL
SECURITY ACT 18 (1962)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
16. Edwin E. Witte, Development of Unemployment Compensation, 55 YALE L.J.
21, 30 (1945). Dr. Witte concluded that the federal-state system "was developed as
an expedient to get the states to enact unemployment compensation laws, with but
little thought as to how the plan would work out once this primary purpose was
realized." Id. at 32.
17. FEDERAL-STATE PARTNERSHIP, supra note 1, at 3-7.
18. See id. at 3. The tax is established by 26 U.S.C. § 3301 (1994). The credit
scheme is described in § 3302. To be certified for the "normal" credit available under
§ 3302(a), state law must meet the requirements of § 3304(a). States certified for the
"normal" credit also will be certified for the "additional" credit if state law meets the
experience-rating requirements of § 3303(a). Although employers in a state may
obtain the full available credit using only the normal credit, currently all states also
obtain credit using the additional credit because this reduces the overall tax burden
on employers. See Federal-State Unemployment Compensation Program: Certifica-
tions Under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act of 1995, 60 Fed. Reg. 56,174 (1995).
The Secretary of Labor issues certifications with respect to the normal and additional
credits each October 31. 26 U.S.C. §§ 3303(b), 3304(c). The amount of credit available
may be reduced if the state does not operate a Trade Readjustment Assistance
Program under § 3302(c)(3) or if the state has an outstanding advance-i.e., a
loan-for the payment of unemployment compensation under Title XII of the Social
Security Act. Id. § 3302(c)(2).
19. See FEDERAL-STATE PARTNERSHIP, supra note 1, at 3.
Federal Law Requirements
must be met for a state to receive administrative funding for
its UC program from the USDOL.2 °
The Senate Finance Committee's report on the legislation
establishing the UC program in 1935 emphasized that the
legislation "does not set up a Federal unemployment compen-
sation system" and that, "[e]xcept for a few standards which
are necessary to render certain that the State unemployment
compensation laws are genuine unemployment compensation
acts and not merely relief measures, the States are left free to
set up any unemployment compensation system they wish,
without dictation from Washington."2' Consistent with this
statement, the original legislation contained twelve broad
requirements for receipt of tax credit or administrative
22grants. Currently, although the states are still free to set up
their own UC systems, a significant number of requirements
have been added.23
If the USDOL believes that the state is not meeting a fed-
eral law requirement, it will raise either a "conformity" or a
"compliance" issue,24 or both. A conformity issue exists when
the state law does not agree with federal law.25 This may occur
either because the state law contains a provision inconsistent
with federal law or because state law omits a provision
20. Id. at 5-7. The requirements are found at 42 U.S.C. § 503 (1994). Certifica-
tions of administrative grants are made "from time to time." Id. § 502(a).
21. S. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (1935).
22. There were originally six requirements for receipt of the normal credit, one
requirement for the additional credit, and eight requirements for the receipt of the
administrative grants; but because three of the normal credit requirements were the
same as three of the grant requirements, there were really only twelve requirements.
See Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, §§ 903(a), 910(a), 49 Stat. 620, 640-41.
23. The requirements added since 1935 are found at 42 U.S.C. §§ 503(a)(7)-(9),
503(c)-(j) (1994), and 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(6)-(18) (1994). A precise count of require-
ments is no longer as easy as counting the number of paragraphs in the law. One
reason is that exceptions to the requirements often have restrictions. For example,
a state may withdraw certain moneys from its unemployment fund for administrative
purposes but only under certain conditions. See 42 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(2). The exception
allowing a state the option to make withdrawals from its unemployment fund for the
payment of self-employment assistance allowances contains 11 restrictions. 26 U.S.C.
§ 3306(t).
24. The Secretary has delegated most matters for the administration of UC to
the Assistant Secretary for Employment and Training; an exception is the authority
to determine conformity and compliance. See Secretary's Order No. 4-75, 40 Fed. Reg.
18,515 (1975) [hereinafter Secretary's Order]. Therefore, the USDOL "raises issues"
while the Secretary determines conformity and compliance. Regulations addressing
conformity and compliance procedures are found at 20 C.F.R. § 601.5 (1995).
25. Post-Hearing Brief for the United States Department of Labor at 27, United
States Dep't of Labor v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Labor and Indus. (1979) (on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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required by federal law.26 The conflict may be created by the
law itself or by administrative or judicial interpretation. A
compliance issue exists when actual state administration
conflicts with federal law by failing to keep mistakes at a
minimum. 28 Thus, conformity is directed at state law while
compliance is directed at the proper administration of the
state law.29
The USDOL uses a variety of methods, including the review
of state enactments, rules, and court cases, in order to deter-
mine if conformity or compliance issues exist."0 The USDOL's
main effort is, however, to prevent issues from developing by
commenting on state legislative proposals or draft rules and
by promoting a general understanding of federal require-
ments."1 The focus of departmental review tends to be linked
to conformity, because all that is needed to raise a conformity
issue is evidence of the meaning of state law.32 For the USDOL
to raise a compliance issue, on the other hand, it is necessary
to obtain evidence that the state deviated from principles of
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 28.
29. The term "conformity" is not found in federal law. For purposes of certifica-
tion for tax credit, federal law does, however, make a distinction between law-i.e.,
conformity-and compliance. See 26 U.S.C. § 3304(c) (1994) (providing that the
Secretary shall not certify a state for normal tax credit if the Secretary "finds [that
the state] has amended its law so that it no longer contains the [required] provisions"
or that it has "failed to comply substantially" with the required provisions). For
purposes of withholding administrative grants, the Social Security Act refers only to
"a failure to comply substantially." 42 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1994). The USDOL still
applies the same distinction, however, between law and practice. 20 C.F.R. §§ 640.2,
650.4 (1995). A more thorough discussion of conformity and compliance is found in
Theodore D. Wagman, Certification for Administrative Grants and Tax Credits Under
Federal Unemployment Compensation Laws: A Case Study of the 1978 and 1979 New
Hampshire Proceedings and Their Settlements 13-21 (1982) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). According to
Wagman, "Substantiality relates to the measure, degree, or quality of carrying out
the Federal law's principles and purposes. Substantiality relates to compliance, not
to non-compliance or to conformity." Id. at 13.
30. See EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE EMPLOY-
MENT SECURITY MANUAL § 1215(B) (1991) [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT SECURITY
MANUAL] (describing the materials that states are to provide for review).
31. See, e.g., Field Memorandum No. 59-93 from Barbara Ann Farmer, Adminis-
trator for Regional Management, Employment and Training Administration, United
States Department of Labor, to All Regional Administrators (June 14, 1993) (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (announcing legislative
seminars "to improve States' understanding of the Federal legislative review process
and improve communications between State agencies and the Department of Labor").
32. Wagman, supra note 29, at 16.
Federal Law Requirements
federal law.3" Even when the USDOL raises an issue based on
compliance, it also raises a conformity issue because a ques-
tion exists as to whether state law authorizes noncompliance. 4
If the USDOL identifies an issue, it will attempt informal
resolution through correspondence and meetings. If these
informal attempts fail, the matter will be elevated to the
Assistant Secretary for Employment and Training, who may
send a "gauntlet" letter to the head of the state agency offer-
ing a last chance to resolve the issue informally. If the state
does not satisfactorily respond to the gauntlet letter, the
Assistant Secretary may refer the matter to the Secretary for
the commencement of administrative proceedings concerning
whether certification should be withheld for tax credits or
administrative grants. 5 Notice of a hearing, which may con-
sist only of an exchange of briefs, is published in the Federal
Register. The current practice is to have an administrative
law judge in the USDOL preside and issue a recommended
decision, which is then sustained, modified, or reversed by the
Secretary. 36 Formal notification of a hearing does not preclude
further informal discussions or resolution. 37 A state may
appeal the Secretary's decision to the United States court of
appeals for the circuit in which the state is located or to the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.38
33. Id. at 16-17.
34. For example, when the USDOL raised a compliance issue with Michigan's
failure to operate a satisfactory quality control program, it also raised a conformity
issue as to whether Michigan's law required the state to operate a satisfactory
quality control program. Letter from Roberts T. Jones, Assistant Secretary of Labor,
United States Department of Labor, to F. Robert Edwards, Director, Michigan
Employment Security Commission (Jan. 19, 1993) (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform). The federal law requirements relating to the
quality control program are found at 20 C.F.R. § 602.10 (1995).
35. Because the Secretary has not delegated the authority to determine conformi-
ty and compliance, the matter must be referred to the Secretary. See Secretary's
Order, supra note 24.
36. See, e.g., In re Minnesota Conformity, No. 88-UIA-9, transmitted by Unem-
ployment Insurance Program Letter No. 25-89, 54 Fed. Reg. 22,973 (1989) (upholding
an administrative law judge's decision); United States Dep't of Labor v. Washington
Employment Sec. Dep't, No. 86-CCP-1, transmitted by Unemployment Insurance
Program Letter No. 15-87 (Mar. 30, 1987) (modifying an administrative law judge's
decision); In re District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., No. 84-CCP-2,
transmitted by Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 18-86 (Mar. 6, 1986)
(reversing an administrative law judge's decision).
37. Notice of hearing is addressed in 20 C.F.R. § 601.5(d) (1995). Informal resolu-
tion is addressed in 20 C.F.R. § 601.5(b) (1995).
38. 26 U.S.C. § 3310(a) (1994); 42 US.C. § 504(a) (1994).
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Withholding certification likely will not occur until the ap-
peals process has been exhausted. 9
Although there are always a number of issues pending
within the USDOL, hearings do not occur frequently because
the USDOL and the states all prefer informal negotiations.40
From 1992 through 1994, eighty-three issues were resolved
informally. The last hearing occurred in 1989. 4' Only twice
have cases gone to the United States courts of appeals. 42 As of
January 1, 1995, there were fifty-two issues pending in the
USDOL.43
The USDOL is also responsible for interpreting federal law
and for conveying these interpretations to the states. The
USDOL serves notice of its interpretations of the federal law
by several means, including USDOL manuals and draft legis-
lation with commentary. Currently, almost all interpretations
are issued to the states through Unemployment Insurance
Program Letters, which are sent by the USDOL to the states
and published in the Federal Register.
II. THE "METHODS OF ADMINISTRATION" REQUIREMENT
As a condition of receiving administrative grants, state law
must provide for "[sluch methods of administration ... as are
found by the Secretary of Labor to be reasonably calculated to
insure full payment of unemployment compensation when
39. The appeal provisions stay the Secretary's action for 60 days from the date
the Secretary notifies the governor of an unfavorable decision and for 30 days
following the commencement of judicial proceedings; the court may issue a further
stay. 26 U.S.C. § 3310(a); 42 U.S.C. § 504(a).
40. RUBIN, supra note 3, at 140. "It is rare for an issue even to go to a hearing,
as evidenced by a history of only about a dozen conformity hearings since 1937." Id.
at 139.
41. These figures are based on an informal survey taken twice yearly by the
Legislative Review and Guidance Group at the USDOL.
42. In 1980, addressing a Tenth Amendment argument, the United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit decided in favor of the USDOL in New Hampshire
Dep't of Employment Sec. v. Marshall, 616 F.2d 240 (1st Cir. 1980). In the same year,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided in favor of Alabama
and Nevada in Alabama v. Marshall, 626 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 905 (1981). See infra notes 206-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of
this case. For a discussion of conformity hearings up to 1982 and of both court cases,
see RUBIN, supra note 3, at 171-229.
43. See supra note 41.
Federal Law Requirements
due."" This requirement merits discussion because it is entire-
ly discretionary on the part of the USDOL. It is "sufficiently
broad to permit virtually any federal control over administra-
tion" the USDOL sees fit to impose.4 5 The broadness of the
requirement has led to litigation with the result that it is
perhaps the best known federal requirement.46 Within the
USDOL, this requirement is often called the "methods of
administration" requirement; outside the USDOL, it is usually
called the "when due" requirement.47
The traditional view is that the methods of administration
required of states are limited to administrative and opera-
tional, as opposed to eligibility, considerations.48 The new view
is that the provision has a far broader scope that includes
eligibility requirements.49 Although one federal court has ques-
tioned the appropriateness of a challenge to the "methods of
administration" requirement in the courts,50 it noted that the
issue is "too'well settled to be questioned."5
Prior to the "methods of administration" requirement becom-
ing a matter of litigation, the USDOL primarily used three
"Secretary's standards" that required specific actions by the
44. 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1) (1994).
45. RUBIN, supra note 3, at 42; see infra note 94 and accompanying text.
46. RUBIN, supra note 3, at 222-24.
47. For example, the Secretary's three standards discussed below, infra text
accompanying notes 52-62, all require "methods of administration" of the states. The
use of "when due" probably arises from the Supreme Court's decision in California
Department of Human Resources Development v. Java, 402 U.S. 121 (1971), which
specifically focused on the meaning of "due."
48. See RUBIN, supra note 3, at 42 (noting that "[flederal influence is applied...
through development and enforcement of detailed operating and performance stan-
dards").
49. See infra text accompanying notes 87-94.
50. In Jenkins v. Bowling, 691 F.2d 1225 (1982), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reasoned that
[o]ne might wonder how a state statute could be challenged as inconsistent with
section 303(a) of the Social Security Act [codified at 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)], and
hence as invalid under the supremacy clause, when section 303(a) does not
purport to require anything of the states. A state can have any kind of unem-
ployment compensation scheme it wants, at least so far as the Social Security
Act is concerned, provided it does not insist on receiving federal money. Since
the Act is addressed not to the state but to the Secretary of Labor, one might
think the appropriate remedy for a violation was an order forbidding the
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states.5 2 As will be discussed below, the USDOL used the
"methods of administration" provision to operationalize,
through fairly specific procedures, other provisions of federal
law relating to withdrawals from state unemployment funds,53
fair hearings,54 and payment through public employment off-
ices.55 First, the Standard for Claims Filing, Claimant Report-
ing, Job Finding and Employment Services5" requires state law
to provide for sufficient contact with "public employment
offices or claims office or both . . . as will reasonably insure
the payment of unemployment compensation only to indivi-
duals who are unemployed and who are able to work and
available for work."57 Second, the Standard for Claim Deter-
mination requires that the state agency: (1) furnish such
information to individuals as will reasonably afford an oppor-
tunity to establish and protect their rights to UC; and (2)
obtain, promptly and prior to determination, facts pertaining
to the individual's eligibility. 59 Finally, the Standard for Fraud
and Overpayment Detection60 requires that the state law
include methods for detecting benefits already paid through
error or willful misrepresentation and for deterring individuals
from obtaining future benefits through misrepresentation. 61 All
three standards contain specific requirements designed to
meet the standard and at the same time provide for the evalu-
ation of alternative state provisions. All three standards were
first issued between 1947 and 1950.62
52. See 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1) (1994) (requiring "methods of administration... as
are found by the Secretary" to be likely to ensure payment).
53. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(4) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(5).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(3).
55. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(2).
56. EMPLOYMENT SECURITY MANUAL, supra note 30, §§ 5000-5004.
57. Id. § 5000(B)(2). The USDOL has recently encouraged states to "move toward
fully implementing telephone claimstaking or other electronic methods of filing."
Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 35-95, 60 Fed. Reg. 55,604 (1995).
Therefore, requirements related to physically reporting to offices appear to be
obsolete; however, the basic standard remains in effect.
58. EMPLOYMENT SECURITY MANUAL, supra note 30, §§ 6000-6015.
59. Id. § 6011.
60. Id. §§ 7500-7519.
61. Id. § 7511.
62. The Standard for Claim Determination dates from 1946. See Unemployment
Insurance Program Letter No. 115 (Apr. 29, 1946). It was revised to its current form
in 1968 by Manual Transmittal Letter No. 1159 (Oct. 28, 1968). I have not been able
to establish exact dates for the creation of the remaining two standards. Both were
part of the EMPLOYMENT SECURITY MANUAL, which was apparently issued in 1950.
See EMPLOYMENT SECURITY MANUAL, supra note 30. The Standard for Fraud and
Overpayment Detection has never been revised, and the Standard for Claims Filing,
Federal Law Requirements
The USDOL also has created methods of administration that
are aimed at creating a UC program that functions effectively.
A 1955 internal document lists thirteen methods of admin-
istration that the USDOL expected to find in state law,
including provisions for adequate staffing and procedures for
prompt determination of claims and appeals; methods for
collecting contributions and provisions for enforcement thereof,
including provisions relating to interest or penalties on delin-
quent payments; provisions requiring employing units to keep
records containing prescribed information; provisions concern-
ing safeguards for information obtained by the state in the
administration of its UC law; and penalties for failure to
comply with the UC law. 3 Unlike the three standards already
discussed, the USDOL has not published specific criteria for
meeting these requirements.6 4 The USDOL has, however,
stated its position on the collection of contributions in regu-
lations, 5 and its position on disclosure of UC information
maintained by the states was the subject of a draft regu-
lation.66
Under the traditional view of the "methods of administra-
tion" requirement, payment "when due" meant payment "when
due under State law."67 The USDOL was also wary of allowing
any payment while a question of eligibility remained. 68 As a
result, the USDOL approved state laws that delayed payment
Claimant Reporting, Job Finding and Employment Service, originally known as the
Standard for Reporting by Claimants, was revised to its current form in 1970 by
Manual Transmittal Letter No. 1215 (Aug. 31, 1970).
63. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Check List of State-Law Provisions to Meet Federal
Requirements with Citations of Draft-Bill Provisions Which Meet Such Requirements
(Feb. 1, 1955) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
64. It has, however, provided draft legislative language for use in implementing
these requirements in state law. BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT SEC., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
MANUAL OF STATE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY LEGISLATION (1950).
65. 20 C.F.R. § 602.11(a) (1995) (establishing a basis for a quality control pro-
gram and requiring the states to collect and handle income for the state's unem-
ployment fund with the greatest accuracy feasible). The section serves, in part, as the
basis for the quality control program itself. See id.
66. Confidentiality and Disclosure of State Records, 57 Fed. Reg. 10,064 (1992).
The basis for restricting UC information is that its disclosure may deter individuals
from filing and employers from providing information and may impede the adminis-
tration of the UC program generally. Id. The proposed regulations have, however,
been taken off the USDOL's regulatory agenda. See Confidentiality and Disclosure
of State Records, 59 Fed. Reg. 20,623 (1994).
67. Brief for the United States Department of Labor as Amicus Curiae at 50-51,
Java v. California Dep't of Human Resources Dev., 317 F. Supp. 875 (N.D. Cal. 1970)
(No. C-69 350).
68. Id. at 51-52.
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to individuals who initially had been determined eligible until
the expiration of the appeals period when facts indicated that
an eligibility issue existed or until the disposition of any
appeal. 69 What was required of a state was that its law con-
tain methods of administration that reasonably insured the
payment of UC only to eligible individuals under state law.
The State of California was one state that suspended pay-
ment when an appeal had been made following an initial
determination of eligibility.7 ° The case of California Depart-
ment of Human Resources Development v. Java7 arose when
two claimants were separated from employment; California
initially determined that the claimants were eligible for UC
and began payments.72 In each individual's case, when the
former employer filed an appeal, the state automatically
stopped payments pending hearing and decision of appeal.73
The claimants filed a class action suit which eventually was
decided by the United States Supreme Court. Instead of focus-
ing on the words, "methods of administration," the Supreme
Court emphasized the use of the word "due":
We conclude the word "due" in § 303(a)(1) [codified at 42
U.S.C. § 503(a)(1)], when construed in light of the purpos-
es of the [Social Security] Act, means the time when
payments are first administratively allowed as a result of
a hearing of which both parties have notice and are per-
mitted to present their respective positions; any other
construction would fail to meet the objective of early
substitute compensation during unemployment. Paying
69. Id. at 50. Appendix A listed the states whose laws had been approved. In
fact, Congress itself included a provision requiring that UC be withheld pending the
outcome of an appeal in the original District of Columbia Unemployment Compensa-
tion Act, Pub. L. No. 74-386, § 12(a), 49 Stat. 946, 951-52 (1935). Congress then
repealed this requirement in the District of Columbia Unemployment Compensation
Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-2 11, § 2(40)(A), 85 Stat. 756, 771, following
the Supreme Court's decision in California Department of Human Resources
Development v. Java, 402 U.S. 121 (1971). See infra notes 71-74 and accompanying
text. Additionally, the President's Committee on Economic Security, which had
prepared the original Social Security Act, had provided Congress with two drafts of
state UC laws designed to help the states meet federal requirements, and both drafts
contained such provisions. See Economic Security Act: Hearings on S. 1130 Before the
Senate Comm. on Fin., 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 592 (1935) (explaining the purposes of
the two drafts, which follow).
70. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1335 (West 1986).
71. 402 U.S. 121 (1971).
72. Id. at 123.
73. Id.
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compensation to an unemployed worker promptly after an
initial determination of eligibility accomplishes the con-
gressional purposes of avoiding resort to welfare and
stabilizing consumer demands; delaying compensation
until months have elapsed defeats these purposes.74
Java and its principal offspring75 resulted in several actions
by the USDOL. First, states were required to modify their
laws to remove provisions inconsistent with Java.76 Although
initially this effort was limited to the provisions similar to or
more stringent than the one at issue in Java itself, the
USDOL would eventually raise issues with at least one other
state law provision.77 Second, the USDOL created specific
methods of administration for the "hearing" required by
Java.78 Third, in conjunction with concerns that courts might
define adequate performance levels if the USDOL did not, the
USDOL created a variety of bench marks to assure claims
were processed promptly.79 Other bench marks are expressed
as "Desired Levels of Achievement."8 ° Even though such bench
marks are "Idlesired" rather than required of the states, the
Java definition of "due" serves as the basis for all bench marks
related to prompt processing of claims, and states that do not
meet these bench marks must submit corrective action plans
as a condition of receiving the following year's UC grant."'
74. Id. at 133.
75. See Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 389 (1975) (considering the prompt
disposition of an appeal of an initial determination of ineligibility and concluding that
"the rapidity of administrative review is a significant factor in assessing the sufficien-
cy of the entire process"); Burtton v. Johnson, 538 F.2d 765 (7th Cir. 1976) (involving
Illinois' failure to make payment promptly after the individual first files a claim for
UC).
76. See Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 1126 (June 14, 1971).
77. See infra notes 95-107 and accompanying text.
78. See Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 1145 (Nov. 12, 1971)
[hereinafter UIPL No. 1145]. The Java hearing is designed to provide reasonable
notice and opportunity to be heard and to result in the prompt payment of UC
benefits. Id. at 3. A full evidentiary hearing is available to individuals and employers
who appeal the decision resulting from the Java hearing. Id. at 3-4.
79. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 640 (1995) (bench marks for first payment promptness); id.
pt. 650 (bench marks for first-level appeals disposition timeliness). Since 1979, the
USDOL publishes annually all bench marks with state-by-state performance. See,
e.g., UNEMPLOYMENT INS. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
QUALITY APPRAISAL RESULTS FY 95 (1995) [hereinafter APPRAISAL RESULTS].
80. APPRAISAL RESULTS, supra note 79, at 5.
81. The Program Budget Plan, published annually, requires states to submit
corrective action plans. See, e.g., EMPLOYMENT & TRAINING ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, ET HANDBOOK No. 336 (1993).
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This bench marking did not prescribe specific methods of
administration as did the Secretary's earlier standards; in-
stead, it measured the outcomes of methods used by the
state. 2 In the case of first payments and for the disposition of
appeals, a standard requires action from the state "with the
greatest promptness that is administratively feasible.""3 The
bench mark is the criterion against which compliance with
this standard is measured. 84 Despite some states' continued
failure to meet these regulatory bench marks,"' no conformity
or compliance proceedings have ever been commenced due to
such failure, nor does it appear that a "gauntlet" letter has
ever been sent due to such failure.8"
82. The criteria for first payment time lapse and first-level appeals disposition
promptness simply require that the states meet a numeric benchmark. For example,
for first-level appeals, states must dispose of 60% of all appeals within 30 days of the
date of appeal and 80% of all appeals within 45 days. 20 C.F.R. § 650.4 (1995). This
implies that the remaining 20% of appeals do not need to be disposed of within any
timeframe. The problems with this approach are discussed in Sharon M. Dietrich &
Cynthia L. Rice, Timeliness in the Unemployment Compensation Appeals Process: The
Need for Increased Federal Oversight, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 235, 252-54 (1996). In
the other instance, the Standard for Claim Determination, supra note 62 and
accompanying text, requires the states to take specific actions in determining a claim.
83. 20 C.F.R. §§ 640.3(a), 650.3(a)(2) (1995).
84. Id. §§ 640.5, 650.4.
85. Dietrich & Rice, supra note 82, at 280-81 app. 1.
86. There are several reasons for not taking action. First, withholding a state's
administrative grants may be too extreme as a mechanism for assuring adequate
performance. However, the USDOL regularly threatens withholdings for conformity
failures. A draft paper notes that a more moderate mechanism might not work: "If
the sanctions had less effect on the program, State officials might be tempted to
disregard Federal standards completely.' Bureau of Employment Sec., U.S. Dep't of
Labor, Sanctions in Unemployment Insurance: A Staff Report 30 (Draft, Mar. 13,
1956) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). Conversely,
the NCUC REPORT, supra note 3, was in favor of the current system because the
existing mechanisms "exert more influence for cooperative action than would occur
with lesser sanctions" and because "Federal officials are more likely to be inclined to
impose more detailed requirements on the States since the consequences of State
violation would be less catastrophic," id. at 149. Second, the USDOL may not want
to be confronted with arguments that it does not adequately fund a state's program.
Louisiana recently requested a hearing before the Secretary on this point. Letter
from Gayle F. Truly, Secretary, State of Louisiana Department of Labor, to Robert
B. Reich, Secretary, United States Department of Labor (Aug. 9, 1995) (on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). Even if the USDOL conceded
that the amounts appropriated by Congress were inadequate, a state must still meet
certain federal law requirements to receive what amounts are available. See 42
U.S.C. 503(a) (1994). Third, if performance is improving, a state may eventually meet
the performance levels. Fourth, there is either a reluctance to devote resources or a
lack of resources to devote to the preliminaries necessary to establish that a state has
failed to take all administratively feasible actions as well as a reluctance to devote
resources to the hearing process itself. This raises a fifth point: in my view, the test
of what is administratively feasible is erroneously applied to what is feasible within
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Following Java, the debate concerning the extent of the
"methods of administration" requirement continued in the
courts. In Pennington v. Didrickson,87 the issue was whether
Illinois' base period was subject to the "methods of administra-
tion" requirement.88 In Illinois, as in all states, employment
performed during the base period determines whether the
individual has sufficient attachment to the labor force to
qualify for UC.89 Illinois' base period was the first four of the
five most recently completed calendar quarters. 90 Employment
during the "lag" quarter between the end of the base period
and the filing of the claim is not used, even if its use would
qualify the individual. 9'
Under the traditional view, although the determination of a
base period may be based in part upon administrative consid-
erations, it is first and foremost an eligibility provision and
therefore not subject to the "methods of administration" re-
quirement.92 In other words, the reason the base-period
provision law exists is to determine whether the individual
qualifies for UC. The opposing view, accepted by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Pennington,
is that, because the base period may be dependent on adminis-
trative considerations related to the state's method of obtain-
ing employment history, it is a "method of administration."93
a state with a performance problem rather than what has proven to be feasible in
other states. This may have encouraged some in the USDOL to think that poor
performance is acceptable in some states. On a final note, the USDOL's performance
measurement system is after the fact: corrective action is required only after
performance has fallen below acceptable levels; the USDOL does not regularly object
to state action or inaction causing the deterioration. See, e.g., infra notes 116-22 and
accompanying text.
87. 22 F.3d 1376 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 U.S. 613 (1994).
88. Id. at 1378.
89. UNEMPLOYMENT INS. SERV., US. DEP'T OF LABOR, COMPARISON OF STATE
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAWS 3-1 (1995) [hereinafter COMPARISON].
90. Id. at 3-23 tbl. 300. Forty-six other states have similar base periods. Id.
Illinois' provision is found at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 347 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1992).
91. COMPARISION, supra note 89, at 3-23 tbl. 300.
92. Pennington, 22 F.3d at 1382-84.
93. Id. at 1387. The court gave weight to the fact that the lag period was a
method of accommodating a system where employers report wages at the end of each
calendar quarter for purposes of determining the individual's attachment to the labor
force. Id. The lag occurs because employers do not immediately report the wages and
because the states do not immediately place the wages in a database. See id. The case
was reversed and remanded to the district court for a determination as to whether
the Illinois base period is consistent with the "methods of administration" require-
ment. Id. at 1388.
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The debate in Pennington revolved around the same basic
issue as the issue in Java: whether a state has erected an
administrative barrier to eligibility. Pennington will likely not
resolve this debate because it did not resolve an issue crucial
to the federal-state system, namely, the tension between
administrative and eligibility provisions. Pennington seems to
say that, if an eligibility provision has any administrative
consideration, then it is subject to the "methods of administra-
tion" requirement and the Secretary or the courts may, in
effect, federalize that requirement.94 The case would appear to
alter radically the premise noted above that, except for a few
standards, states are free to operate their own UC programs
without dictation from the USDOL.
One of the results of Java was that the USDOL would now
scrutinize provisions of state law that were previously deemed
eligibility provisions, and therefore left to the state, in order
to determine whether they were administrative barriers to the
payment of UC. In the late 1980s, the USDOL challenged New
York's law that withheld payment of UC "during the pendency
of criminal proceedings following an indictment against the
claimant" until any criminal charges were resolved. 95 The
USDOL raised a "methods of administration" issue, pointing
to the Java Court's interpretation of "due" and the require-
ment in its Standard for Claim Determination96 that the state
agency gather such facts pertaining to the individual's eli-
gibility as will be reasonably sufficient to insure the payment
of UC when due.97 In the USDOL's view, New York's UC laws
were passing that responsibility to another party and, in doing
so, introducing a procedure that had no result other than to
delay the state's determination.98 Furthermore, the USDOL
believed that, when a determination was issued to an
94. Eligibility provisions that include administrative considerations and, there-
fore, could be affected include the definition of"base period," which has a cutoff date;
the use of wages-which must be reported for tax purposes-instead of hours of work
for determining an individual's attachment to the labor force; and limiting an
examination of earnings only to quarters-because that is how the wages are
reported-which results in some individuals being determined ineligible simply
because of the way their wages are distributed between quarters.
95. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 593.4 (McKinney 1988).
96. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
97. Letter from Thomas E. Hill, Regional Administrator, Employment and
Training Administration, United States Department of Labor, to Thomas F. Hartnet,
Commissioner, New York Department of Labor 1-2 (Jan. 11, 1990) (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
98. Id. at 2.
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individual under a "hold in abeyance" provision, the deter-
mination would simply be to withhold UC that may have been
due based on the facts currently available to the state UC
agency.99
When New York's law was challenged, the state objected to
the USDOL's position, citing Jenkins v. Bowling, °° in which
the United States'Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
addressed an Illinois statute with identical effect:' 01
If Illinois had good reason to postpone the payment of
benefits to these people, then, bearing in mind that the
state has a legitimate interest in enforcing its valid eligi-
bility criteria and minimizing its administrative expenses,
we would not regard § 303(a)(1) [codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 503(a)(1)1- which only requires administrative methods
"reasonably calculated" to ensure prompt payment-as a
bar to postponement. But postponement must not be un-
reasonable.'1 2
In remanding the case to the district court, the court of ap-
peals stated that "[tihe goal of the decree in this case should
be a procedure that will substantially reduce the 40 percent
error rate and 448-day average delay of the current procedure"
and directed the district court to issue an order that enjoined
Illinois from "enforcing the held in abeyance proviso as cur-
rently written and enforced but that does not specify the exact
measures that the state must take to bring itself into compli-




100. 691 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1982), cited in Letter from Barbara C. Deinhardt,
Deputy Commissioner of Labor for Legal Affairs and Counsel, New York State
Department of Labor, to Thomas E. Hill, Regional Administrator, Employment and
Training Administration, United States Department of Labor (Mar. 14, 1990) (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). The USDOL appears to
have been unaware of the Jenkins case prior to the decision by the court of appeals.
101. Illinois law provides that, if an individual "is in legal custody, held on bail
or is a fugitive from justice, the determination of his benefit rights shall be held in
abeyance pending the result of any legal proceedings arising therefrom." ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 48, para. 432.B (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992).
102. Jenkins, 691 F.2d at 1229.
103. Id. at 1234.
104. The "hold in abeyance" provision is still in Illinois law, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
48, para. 432.B (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992), but the Illinois Department of Labor did
advise the State UC staff that the provision was no longer in effect. See Division of
Unemployment Ins., Illinois Dep't of Labor, Benefit Section Bulletin No. 1513 and
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The USDOL did not accept New York's argument that there
could be an acceptable delay.1" 5 In the USDOL's view, what
mattered was that the state had introduced an administrative
procedure-the awaiting of a court decision-which had the
sole effect of delaying a determination of whether UC was
due.'0 6 New York eventually did accept the USDOL's posi-
tion. 10 7 Because Jenkins provided an alternative view, it
weakened the USDOL's position by encouraging state disputa-
tion.
The distinctions between the lag period in Pennington and
the "hold in abeyance" provision in Jenkins may not appear
obvious because both affect when, if ever, the individual will
receive UC. In the USDOL's view there is a major distinction.
Eligibility is left to the states; 08 however, once a state chooses
its eligibility requirements, it must adhere to methods of
administration guaranteeing payment as soon as administra-
tively feasible under those requirements.' 9 Therefore, a
provision of state law that may result in a determination that
the individual does not have sufficient wages in the base
period is an eligibility provision not subject to the "methods of
administration" requirement." 0 Conversely, the determination
under a "hold in abeyance" provision is simply that the state
will make no determination or, alternatively, ignore a determi-
nation that may already have been made. Thus, similar to
other "methods of administration" requirements imposed by
the USDOL, the issue is not the state's basic eligibility provi-
sion, but how the states operationalize it. States are free to
Appeals Section Bulletin No. 117 (June 7, 1982) (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
105. Letter from Thomas E. Hill to Thomas F. Hartnet, supra note 97, at 1. The
USDOL also objected to the provision because it had the effect of surrendering UC
responsibilities to another public body. Id. at 2.
106. See id. at 1-2.
107. The "hold in abeyance" provision was amended. See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 593(4)
(McKinney 1991).
108. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8-10, Pennington v.
Didrickson, 22 F.3d 1376 (7th Cir.) (No. 92-3725), cert. denied, 115 U.S. 613 (1994).
109. See 20 C.F.R. § 640.1(a) (1995) (calling for "methods of administration of the
law that are reasonably calculated to insure the full payment of unemployment
compensation when determined under the State law to be due to claimants"); id.
§ 640.3(a) (calling for state law to include provision for "such methods of administra-
tion as will reasonabl[y] insure the full payment of unemployment benefits to eligible
claimants with the greatest promptness that is administratively feasible").
110. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8-10, Pennington (No. 92-
3725).
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deny UC to individuals who have been convicted of a crime."1
What the states may not do is delay a determination of eligi-
bility pending the outcome of a criminal proceeding.
Even if one takes the traditional view of the "methods of
administration" requirement,"' it is remarkable how infre-
quently the reviewing authority granted by the "methods of
administration" requirement has been used. As noted above,
the USDOL's energies in interpreting and applying the provi-
sion have been mainly limited to the three standards issued
between 1947 and 1950,' some general requirements for
administering a UC program," 14 and the interpretations caused
by Java.11
5
Two examples may be helpful in examining the extent of
departmental restraint. First, the USDOL was aware that,
especially during periods of high unemployment, staff mem-
bers normally assigned to following-up with employers who
are late paying UC taxes were transferred to claims functions,
with the result that the delinquencies increased."6 This conse-
quence did not, however, occur in states using automated
delinquency systems." 7 To remedy the problem relating to
increased delinquencies, the USDOL could have created a
method of administration requiring that states maximize use
of automated delinquency systems by a certain date. This
would appear to have been a noncontroversial requirement
because, given the almost universal conversion to automated
systems for routine tasks, states would likely have done this
anyway. The USDOL, however, did not create such a require-
ment."8
111. Both Illinois and New York law continue to do so. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48,
para. 432.B (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 593.4 (McKinney 1988).
112. See supra text accompanying note 48.
113. See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 76-86 and accompanying text.
116. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE: OPPORTUNITIES
TO STRENGTHEN THE TAX COLLECTION PROCESS 29, 31 (1989).
117. Id. at 32. Although the report clearly established the advantage of an auto-
mated delinquency system over a manual system in this and other regards, it did not
actually recommend an increased level of automation.
118. The report suggests two reasons. First, "[a]lthough [the USDOL] monitors
states' performance in collecting [UC] revenues, it has chosen to take a passive
oversight role." Id. at 15. Second, "[the USDOL] stated [in meetings with the General
Accounting Office] that the focus of federal oversight has shifted from concern with
process to an emphasis on program outcomes." Id. at 22.
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The second example involves statewide hiring freezes,
furloughs, shutdowns, or other personnel practices that are
imposed during recessions when state tax revenues drop.
During recessions, UC workload increases and the USDOL
may increase its funding to the states to accommodate this
workload." 9 The result of statewide hiring freezes and other
personnel practices is that the state UC agency is denied the
flexibility to hire or otherwise use its personnel resources
when that flexibility is most needed. 12 The USDOL could
interpret the "methods of administration" requirement to
prohibit the imposition of such statewide personnel practices
on state UC agencies on the ground that these practices are
unrelated to the workload needs of the UC program and,
therefore, not a "method of administration" reasonably calcu-
lated to insure full payment when due. 12' The USDOL has not
done so, even though it has not been disputed that these
personnel practices have affected services, especially the
timely determination of eligibility issues and the timely dispo-
sition of appeals.
22
To summarize, the history of the "methods of administra-
tion" requirement is that of a tension between two extremes.
On the one hand, states are generally left free to operate their
UC programs without dictation from the USDOL. 23 On the
119. See Dietrich & Rice, supra note 82, at 251-52 (discussing the effects of
workload increases on appeals). A detailed explanation of the USDOL's funding
system is found in UNEMPLOYMENT INS. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, GRANTS TO
STATES FOR COSTS OF ADMINISTRATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAWS 9 (1993).
120. See Dietrich & Rice, supra note 82, at 119, 120 (discussing the effect of state
hiring freezes). In discussing the effects of layoffs, furloughs, and shutdowns in hard
times, the President of the National Association of Unemployment Insurance
Appellate Boards noted that [tihis Alice in Wonderland approach to management is
painful." Allan Toubman, President's Column, NAUIAB NEWSLETTER (National Assoc.
of Unemployment Ins. Appellate Bds., Denver, Colo.), Nov. 1991, at 1.
121. In fact, this would be an application of the interpretation that state law must
provide for adequate staffing for purposes of prompt determination of claims. See
supra text accompanying note 63.
122. In meetings that I attended at the USDOL between August 1991 and
December 1992, I perceived two main objections to establishing this method of
administration. First, some claimed the USDOL would, at the time the personnel
practice was imposed, be required to prove that a deterioration in performance would
be inevitable. This argument confuses law (conformity) with practice or performance
(compliance). If a state law permits personnel practices that do not take into account
the needs of the UC program, then the issue is with the state's law, not its perfor-
mance. Second, there appeared to be a reluctance to pursue an issue which could be
politically charged since it is the governor who imposes the statewide personnel
practice.
123. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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other, the "methods of administration" requirement gives the
USDOL such broad authority that the USDOL could, in effect,
federalize substantial parts of the UC program. This tension
has acted to limit the administrative methods that have been
required of the states by the USDOL, with the result that the
primary thrust in interpreting the "methods of administration"




The federal law requirements discussed in this section are
minimums that grant the states considerable flexibility. As
noted in Part II, the notion that states are generally free to
operate their UC programs without direction from the USDOL
has influenced the USDOL's application of federal law. As a
result, when a new requirement is placed on the states, the
USDOL generally has appeared to follow two rules of construc-
tion. First, because such a requirement infringes on areas
otherwise left to the states, it is construed as narrowly as
possible while reasonably effectuating its purpose. Second, any
language that may be construed as leaving discretion to the
states is broadly construed unless there are compelling rea-
sons for a narrow construction. I will give four examples of
how these rules of construction have been applied.
A. The Double Dip
According to a Senate Finance Committee report, there was
"a much criticized and illogical aspect of some State benefit
formulas" caused by lags between the end of the base period 25
"and the period during which rights based on such wages
credits may be used-called the 'benefit year.' ,,126 Depending
on the state's law, an individual could qualify for a second
124. See supra notes 71-111 and accompanying text.
125. For a discussion of the "base period," see supra note 87-91 and accompanying
text.
126. S. REP. No. 752, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1970).
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benefit year---or "double dip" on the same period of employ-
ment-without any subsequent work.
To resolve this "double dipping" issue, Congress amended
federal law to provide that "an individual who has received
compensation during his benefit year is required to have had
work since the beginning of such year in order to qualify for
compensation in his next benefit year."127 The Senate report
accompanying the bill made it clear that considerable discre-
tion was left to the states: "The bill does not specify how much
work would be required or whether it need be in covered
employment. The committee believes that these matters
should be left to the judgment of the individual States .... ,,12
Thus, states could require as little as one hour of work in the
benefit year. Although Congress indicated that the term,
"work," need not be limited to covered employment, it did not
indicate how broadly the term should be construed.'29
Under the rules of construction followed by the USDOL,
there was, for purposes of effectuating the statute, a compel-
ling reason for defining "work." For example, allowing unre-
munerated services such as household chores or volunteer
activities to be included in the term "work" would render the
requirement meaningless because every individual likely
would meet the "work" test.130 In addition, these types of
activities do not measure the individual's attachment to the
labor force, which is the basic test of eligibility for the UC
system. 131
127. Employment Security Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-373, § 121(a), 84
Stat. 695, 701 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(7) (1994)).
128. S. REP. No. 752, supra note 126, at 21.
129. See id.
130. The legislative history indicates concern that the double dip was caused "by
a single separation." Id. The suggestion that Congress required a second separation
from work would appear to preclude the use of routine nonremunerative services to
meet the requalifying requirement.
131. See COMPARISON, supra note 89, at 4-1; see also S. REP. No. 628, supra note
21, at 11 ("Payment of compensation is conditioned upon continued involuntary
unemployment."); Gladys Harrison, Forenote: Statutory Purpose and "Involuntary
Unemployment," 55 YALE L.J. 117, 119 (1945) ("In the case of unemployment compen-
sation laws the concept of the involuntary character of the unemployment which is
to be compensated is pegged by the condition, found in all laws, that the worker to
be eligible must be 'available for work.'. . . [Tihe worker must want employment, not
unemployment, and must signify his desire at the point where its authenticity may
be put to realistic test.").
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Based on these concerns, the USDOL defined "work" as "the
performance of services for which remuneration is payable." 32
"Work" may even include self-employment activities. 133 On the
other hand, "work" does not include disability pay, vacation
pay, separation pay, or sick pay, because these payments do
not represent remuneration for services.1 34 Whether an indi-
vidual on "on-call" status is working depends on whether the
individual is unable to use the time effectively for his own
purposes, or whether the time belongs to and is controlled by
the employer.
13
Thus, in construing a statute that was extremely broad, the
USDOL added a definition that limited state discretion. This
limitation appears not to have created any problems for the
states, as departmental records do not identify any case where
the USDOL raised a conformity issue with a state based on
the state's definition of work.
B. Approved Training
In 1976, Congress took action to "remove the impediments
to training which remain in our unemployment insurance
system." 13 Federal law was amended to provide that
compensation shall not be denied to an individual for any
week because he is in training with the approval of the
State agency (or because of the application, to any such
week in training, of State law provisions relating to avail-
ability for work, active search for work, or refusal to accept
work)."'
132. UNEMPLOYMENT INS. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, DRAFT LEGISLATION TO
IMPLEMENT THE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY AMENDMENTS OF 1970 H.R. 14705, at 47
[hereinafter 1970 DRAFT LEGISLATION]; Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No.
18-92, 57 Fed. Reg. 47,871 (1992).
133. See 1970 DRAFT LEGISLATION, supra note 132, at 47.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. S. REP. NO. 752, supra note 126, at 21-22.
137. Employment Security Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-373, § 121(a), 84
Stat. 695, 701 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(8) (1994)).
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Congress did not provide any guidance as to what constituted
"training with the approval of the State agency." The USDOL
had to decide whether to provide any guidance with regard to
this change in the law.
The first question is whether the statute gives the USDOL
the authority to establish a minimum requirement-it did,
after all, apply to "training with the approval of the State
agency." 3 ' Under the USDOL's rules of construction, the
language concerning state approval would appear to leave the
matter to the states. There was, however, a compelling reason
for establishing a minimum requirement because states could
simply refuse to approve any training or set prohibitive condi-
tions on approval. The USDOL could argue that the language
referring to state approval only acknowledged the fact that it
was the state, not the individual, who determined whether the
training would be approved. Therefore, a minimum require-
ment could be established governing the conditions under
which the state could approve the training.
In the end, the USDOL decided that,
[uinder the Federal requirements, each State is free to
determine what training is appropriate for a claimant,
what criteria are established for approval of training for
an individual, and what safeguards are established to
assure that the claimant for whom the training has been
approved is actually attending such training.'39
Four years later, the USDOL directed states to apply reason-
able criteria for approval of training. 40 Although the USDOL
provided examples of reasonable criteria, it established no
definitive test. The USDOL did state, however, that approval
could not be withheld or the payment of UC reduced where the
individual was receiving payments to offset the direct cost of
training.' Further, approval of training could not be withheld
because the individual was residing in or filing from another
state. 4 2
138. Id.
139. 1970 DRAFT LEGISLATION, supra note 132, at 62.
140. See Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 1276 (July 22, 1974).
141. Id. at 4.
142. Id. at 4-6. The position concerning out-of-state training was recently
reiterated in Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 2-96, 60 Fed. Reg. 55,604,
55,610 (1995).
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The change requiring unspecified "reasonable criteria" was
significant in that it prohibited states from establishing crite-
ria so rigorous that individuals would never receive approval
and from denying approval in certain instances. However,
consistent with the USDOL's first rule of construction, this
change was not so intrusive that states that had approved
training provisions prior to the enactment of the federal law
provision would be required to make substantive changes.
The reasonableness requirement avoids a situation where
the USDOL may have second-guessed any denial of approval.
Instead, the USDOL limited its ability to object only to partic-
ular situations. As will be discussed further below,143 the
USDOL avoids interjecting itself into situations involving
specific determinations of eligibility. Finally, flexibility at the
state level allows states to avoid absurd situations. Subse-
quent events show why the final point has merit. Eligible
dislocated workers participating in training under the Jobs
Training Partnership Act (JTPA)44 must be considered to be
in approved training for UC purposes.'45 One state asked the
USDOL about the unequal application created when the JTPA
approved training that the state UC agency would not have
approved. 4 ' The agency attached approvals, including two
where all that had been required of the individuals were
three-hour-per-week JTPA courses; one was for art apprecia-
tion and the other was for computer training.'47 In one case,
art appreciation, it was not clear how the course would im-
prove the individual's chances of finding work. 4 ' Another
concern the state may have had was that the training was not
full-time. Individuals who work part-time during a week must
still be available for, search for, and accept work for periods of
143. See infra Part IV.B.
144. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1792b (1994).
145. See id. § 1661(c)(f)(2).
146. Letter from Keith W. Ahue, Director, State of Hawaii Department of Labor
and Industrial Relations, to Don A. Balcer, Regional Administrator, Employment and
Training Administration, United States Department of Labor (Jan. 13, 1993) (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
147. Id.
148. The USDOL has stated that "State regulations should assure. .. that the
training course is consistent with objectives of the unemployment insurance program,
e.g., reemployment of the individual in stable employment." 1970 DRAFT LEGISLATION,
supra note 132, at 63. Hawaii law provides for approval of training if the "course
relates to an occupation or skill for which there are, or are expected to be in the
immediate future, reasonable employment opportunities in the locality." HAW. REv.
STAT. § 383-29(e)(2) (1995).
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unemployment during the week.'49 Therefore, it would seem
appropriate to require the same of individuals in training only
a few hours each week. The USDOL advised that JTPA law
plainly required the training to be approved for UC purposes
and that the normal UC eligibility requirements could not be
applied to the claimant. 150 Even though JTPA approval may
have been proper-for example, the individual needed the
course to complete a degree-the effect on the UC program
appears illogical because the individual could have sought and
obtained part-time work without harming the chances of
completing the course.
In summary, with regard to approved training, states were
required to enact a provision of state law, and, except for the
JTPA requirement, proceed as they chose. Except for those
issues relating to JTPA flexibility, I have not seen an ap-
proved training question, much less a conformity issue, raised
in the ten years that I have worked with conformity require-
ments.
C. Aliens
In 1976, Congress became concerned with the payment of
UC to illegal aliens. 51 As a result, in 1976 Congress amended
federal law to require, among other things, that UC shall not
be payable on the basis of services performed by an alien
unless the alien was in one of two categories when the services
were performed: either the alien was lawfully admitted for
permanent residence, or she was permanently residing in the
United States under color of law (commonly abbreviated as
149. All states provide for the payment of UC when underemployment reaches a
certain stage. COMPARISON, supra note 89, at 3-7. Unavailability for work may be
indicated by substantial restrictions upon the conditions of work. Id. at 4-1. The
period of availability measured is the period for which UC is claimed. Id.
150. Letter from Don A. Balcer, Regional Administrator, Employment and
Training Administration, United States Department of Labor, to Keith W. Ahue,
Director, State of Hawaii Department of Labor and Industrial Relations 2-3 (Jan. 29,
1993) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
151. See, e.g., 122 CONG. REC. 22,524 (1976) (statement of Rep. Biaggi) ("Passage
of this amendment is essential if we are to put an end to the abuses in the unem-
ployment benefit system which have allowed illegal aliens to collect millions of
dollars in benefits at the expense of the American taxpayers.").
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PRUCOL). 5 2 In 1977, a third category was added to allow the
use of services performed by aliens lawfully present for per-
forming such services, meaning that the alien had work autho-
rization when the services were performed.'53 In addition,
amendatory language made clear that, in order to be used for
UC purposes, services had to be performed by aliens during
periods in which they were in any of the three categories.'54
The first issue facing the USDOL was the extent to which
the states had to adopt the provision. Because the USDOL
broadly construes language, which may be interpreted as
leaving discretion to the states, the USDOL interpreted the
provision to require only that state law provide for a denial to
aliens. 5 5 Whether the state chose to pay any aliens by includ-
ing any of the three exceptions found in federal law was for
the state to decide.56
The next issue for the USDOL to decide was whether to
provide specific guidance on the three categories of eligible
aliens. Similar to the approved training provision, there were
compelling reasons for providing an interpretation: through
liberal interpretation of the categories, the requirement could
be rendered meaningless because no aliens would be denied
UC. Unlike the approved training provision, there was no
language that would indicate that the matter should be left to
the states. 5 7 Also, the determination of which individuals
shall be admitted to the United States and for what purposes
are peculiarly questions of federal law, 5 ' so the USDOL could
152. Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-566,
§ 314(a), 90 Stat. 2667, 2680 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(14)(A) (1994)).
153. Emergency Unemployment Compensation Extension Act of 1977, Pub. L. No.
95-19, § 302, 91 Stat. 39, 44 (codified at 26 U.S.C. 3304(a)(14)(A) (1994)).
154. Id.
155. The clearest statement of this position is in Unemployment Insurance Pro-
gram Letter No. 1-86, Change 1, 56 Fed. Reg. 29,719 (1991) [hereinafter UIPL No.
1-86, Change 1]. It is not clear when the USDOL adopted this position. Because all
state laws contain the original exceptions, the "lawfully admitted for permanent
residence" and PRUCOL categories, the USDOL apparently assumed at first that the
categories had to be included in state law. Not all state laws, however, contain the
"lawfully present for performing services" category, which was added to 26 U.S.C.
§ 3304(a)(14)(A) by the Emergency Unemployment Compensation Extension Act of
1977, 91 Stat. at 44. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 444 (Smith-Hurd 1986).
Thus, it appears that the USDOL adopted its current position around the same time
as the "lawfully present for performing services" category was added to federal law.
156. UIPL No. 1-86, Change 1, supra note 155, at 29,720.
157. Cf supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text (discussing the approved
training provisions). The relevant statute concerning aliens does not reference the
states in any way. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(14)(A) (1994).
158. Esparza v. Valdez, 612 F. Supp. 241, 243 (D. Colo. 1985), affd, 862 F.2d 788
(10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 905 (1989).
FALL 1995-WINTER 1996]
554 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 29:1&2
have deemed it inappropriate to turn the matter entirely over
to the states. The USDOL provided extensive guidance in
1977.59 When further questions arose concerning the applica-
tion of the three categories, and amid concerns that applica-
tions by the states were not uniform, the USDOL issued
further guidance in 1986 and 1989.160
Although states could not be more liberal than the USDOL
in their definitions of the categories, they could be more
restrictive.' 6' Thus, at least at one time, some states construed
the "lawfully present for performing services" category to
pertain only to aliens who crossed the border each day to work
in the United States and then returned, whereas the USDOL
construed the category to pertain to any alien with work
authorization. 162 In addition, some states' current statutory
definitions of PRUCOL are narrower than the USDOL's. 163
159. EMPLOYMENT & TRAINING ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, DRAFT LANGUAGE
AND COMMENTARY TO IMPLEMENT THE UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION AMENDMENTS
OF 1976-P.L. 94-566, Supp. 3 at 9-29 (1977) [hereinafter 1976 DRAFT LANGUAGE].
160. See Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 1-86, 51 Fed. Reg. 29,713
(1986); UIPL No. 1-86, Change 1, supra note 155. The USDOL has also addressed
alien status in Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 12-87, 54 Fed. Reg.
10,102 (1989) and Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 12-87, Change 1, 54
Fed. Reg. 10,102, 10,113 (1989). Both of these issuances addressed the provisions of
the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, §§ 201, 302, 100
Stat. 3359, 3394, 3417 (codified at scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). Finally, Unemploy-
ment Insurance Program Letter No. 6-89, 54 Fed. Reg. 10,102 (1989) addressed a
provision of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 100-204, § 902, 101
Stat. 1331, 1400 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1255a (1994)).
161. UIPL No. 1-86, Change 1, supra note 155, at 29,720.
162. See id. (describing the USDOL's interpretation). Although I have discussed
this interpretation with states that followed it, I am unaware of any state statute
actually containing it. Apparently, states adopted this restrictive interpretation at
the urging of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), which objected to
the USDOL's broad reading of the "lawfully present for performing such services"
requirement when Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 1-86 was created.
Letter from Maurice C. Inman, Jr., General Counsel, Immigration and Naturalization
Service, to William H. DuRoss III, Assistant Solicitor for Employment and Training,
United States Department of Labor 2 (Nov. 2, 1984) (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform). The INS based its position on the legislative
history, which references only Canadian and Mexican residents who cross the border
to work during the day and who return home at night. Id.; S. REP. No. 95-67, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1977). The USDOL felt that, notwithstanding this intent, the
provision itself was broadly written to include all aliens with work authorization. See
UIPL No. 1-86, Change 1, supra note 155, at 29,720. Colorado, which used the more
restrictive interpretation, found that courts would turn to the more inclusive
interpretation as a basis of resolving PRUCOL cases. See Esparza v. Valdez, 862 F.2d
788, 793 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 905 (1989); Bushehri v. Industrial
Claim Appeals Office, 749 P.2d 439, 440 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987). The INS's interest in
UC matters is illustrated by the fact that the brief for the United States in Esparza
was prepared by the Office of Immigration Litigation in the Department of Justice.
862 F.2d at 791. In contrast, the Department of Labor was silent in that case. See id.
163. For example, Colorado law contains a limited list of aliens in PRUCOL
status. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-73-107(a) (Supp. 1995). New Jersey law requires aliens
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Since PRUCOL exists in other federal statutes164 and the
burden of interpretation rests heavily on administrative
agencies and courts, it is not surprising that different inter-
pretations have arisen.165 The USDOL has been criticized for
not adopting the liberal interpretations and because there has
been a considerable amount of litigation concerning PRUCOL
in the UC context.166 The complaint that Congress itself did
not know what was intended by the term is often heard in the
USDOL. Notably, the PRUCOL provision is confusingly writ-
ten because it applies the concept of "color of law" to aliens
who are residing under statutory authority.
16 7
In sum, with the alien provision, the USDOL has interpret-
ed a provision to place minimum requirements on the states
while allowing the states to be more restrictive. The USDOL's
current position, however, which is not universally accepted,
was arrived at only after some time. This delay was caused by
the fact that the USDOL has been required to interpret a
vague provision-at least as regards PRUCOL-and to become
involved in an area previously unrelated to the UC program-
alien status. From the states' perspective, it was probably not
always clear what the requirements were, because two of the
USDOL's principal issuances on alien status were not issued
until ten and thirteen years after the provision's enactment.
168
in PRUCOL status also to be lawfully present for performing services. N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 43:21-4(i)(1) (West Supp. 1995).
164. Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Supplemental Security Income,
and Medicaid all contain PRUCOL provisions. See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 602(a)(33), 1382c(a)(1)(B), 1396b(v)(1) (1994).
165. Cf, e.g., Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556 (2d Cir. 1985) (involving Supple-
mental Security Income payments and recognizing many more groups of aliens as
being PRUCOL than does the USDOL).
166. Irene Scharf, Preemption by Fiat: The Department of Labor's Usurpation of
Power over Noncitizen Workers'Rights to Unemployment Benefits, 56 ALB. L. REV. 561
(1993). Scharf's article cites court cases disagreeing with the USDOL's position, id.
at 567-77, and argues that, rather than providing a definition, the USDOL should
have let a common law definition of PRUCOL develop, id. at 607-08.
167. See 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(14)(A) (1994) (including in the term PRUCOL "an
alien who was lawfully present in the United States as a result of the application of
the provisions of section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act [8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(d)(5)]," which relates to refugee status). The same point applies to conditional
entrants under § 203(c)(7) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1153(c)(7) (1994), a group that was removed from 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(14)(A) by the
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 162(e)(4), 104 Stat. 4978, 5011. See
Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 14-91, 56 Fed. Reg. 29,719 (1991).
168. See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
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D. Retirement Pay
As an increasing number of older workers began receiving
retirement pay, the relationship of UC to that retirement pay
came under discussion. 169 One theory for requiring the deduc-
tion of retirement payments from UC is that no individual
should receive duplicate payments for not working, especially
when the same employer finances both payments. 7 ° Another
is that receipt of retirement pay indicates that the individual
is no longer attached to the labor force. 7' When first consider-
ing this issue, Congress noted that a number of people
receiving retirement payments "ha[d] actually withdrawn from
the labor force [and were] being paid unemployment com-
pensation."17 2 Therefore, "a uniform rule [was] required." 173 Ac-
cordingly, federal law was amended in 1976 to require that
UC be reduced by any amount that the individual is receiving
as "a governmental or other pension, retirement or retired
pay, annuity, or any other similar periodic payment which is
based on the previous work of such individual." 74
Even in 1976, it was widely anticipated that Congress would
revisit this "uniform rule." 75 In 1976, the USDOL notified
states that they should consider enacting a broad state-law
provision that would automatically incorporate any later
federal requirement related to retirement payments. 176 Al-
though Congress extended the original effective date, which
applied to weeks beginning after September 30, 1979, to weeks
beginning after March 31, 1980,177 it was not until 1981 that
169. HABER & MURRAY, supra note 3, at 309-11.
170. RUBIN, supra note 3, at 91.
171. HABER & MURRAY, supra note 3, at 311. The theories against requiring a
reduction from UC are that pensions are payments for past services and that individ-
uals who continue to seek work do so because their retirement payments are insuffi-
cient. Id. at 310-11.
172. S. REP. No. 1265, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1976).
173. Id.
174. Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-566,
§ 314(a), 90 Stat. 2667, 2680 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(15) (1994)).
175. See H.R. REP. No. 1745, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1976) (demonstrating an
intent to permit "the National Commission on Unemployment Compensation an
opportunity for a thorough study of this issue and the Congress to act in light of its
findings and recommendations").
176. Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 10-77 (Dec. 30, 1976).
177. Emergency Unemployment Compensation Extension Act of 1977, Pub. L. No.
95-19, § 302(e), 91 Stat. 39, 45.
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the final requirement, which by then was no longer a "uniform
rule," was established. 7 s States were now required to deduct
retirement pay "if and only if": (1) the plan was maintained or
contributed to by a base period or chargeable employer; and
(2) the services performed for this employer affected the
individual's eligibility for the retirement payment or increased
the amount of the retirement payment. 179 More importantly,
states were allowed to "take into account" contributions made
by the individual to the retirement plan for purposes of deter-
mining the amount of the reduction."8 " Under these amend-
ments, Congress appeared less interested in the retirement
payment as a test of availability than with preventing dupli-
cate payments attributable to the same employer.
The requirements discussed above suggest several contradic-
tions. On the one hand, the provision concerning the types of
payments affecting UC was written very broadly; not only did
it list several types of payments, but it also required deduction
of all similar periodic payments.' Thus, all these types of pay-
ments were required to be deducted, even though identifying
every similar periodic payment has been a problem.'82 On the
other hand, the reduction in UC is required "if and only if" the
retirement payments are attributable to base period or charge-
able employers,' or if such payments increased the amounts
or affected eligibility for the retirement payment.'84 Given its
rule of construction leaving discretion to the states, the
USDOL determined that states had the latitude to implement
178. See Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-364,
§ 414, 94 Stat. 1208, 1310 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(15) (1994)).
179. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(15)(A).
180. Id. § 3304(a)(15)(B). This "take into account" language is so broad that it had
the effect of nullifying the exception to the retirement pay provision. See id.
§ 3304(a)(15)(A)(ii). That section provides that the deduction from UC is not required
when base-period services affect neither the individual's eligibility for the retirement
payment nor the amount of the payment. Id. However, the section clearly provided
that payments made under the Social Security Act and the Railroad Retirement Act
of 1974 were not part of the exception. Id. Because both Social Security and Railroad
Retirement payments are contributed to by the individual, see 42 U.S.C. § 401 (1994);
26 U.S.C. §§ 3301, 3307 (1994) (Social Security); 26 U.S.C. § 3201 (1994) (Railroad
Retirement), the "take into account" language means that such amounts need not be
deducted.
181. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(15).
182. See Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 22-87, 52 Fed. Reg. 22,546
(1987) [hereinafter UIPL No. 22-87] ("No exhaustive list of all the kinds of payments
that are deductible is available.").
183. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(15).
184. Id. § 3304(a)(15)(A).
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these exceptions either in their entirety or piecemeal. 185 Fur-
ther, although the "take into account" provision i s6 could be
added to state law at the state's option, the exact meaning of
"take into account," and therefore the extent of the state's
latitude, would be determined only through litigation.
Following the 1980 amendment, the USDOL originally
indicated that the states had broad latitude concerning the
"take into account" provision, up to the point of entirely elimi-
nating the reduction if an individual contributed any amount
to the plan.' s As the result of criticism from congressional
staff, however, the USDOL reversed itself and provided a
restrictive interpretation limiting state latitude: the percentage
of the retirement payment disregarded could not exceed the
percentage that the individual contributed to the retirement
plan. 1
88
The new interpretation was challenged in federal court.
8 9
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia ruled that the part of the USDOL's issuance relating to the
percentage of the retirement payment disregarded under the
"take into account" provision was "subject to the [rulemaking]
procedures of the Administrative Procedures Act and the
Secretary [could] be enjoined from using them in assessing the
appropriateness of certifying a state under the Federal Act."190
The court also indicated a dim view of the USDOL's new
interpretation, noting that the "take into account" provision
was "very broad and Congress obviously intended to permit the
185. See UIPL No. 22-87, supra note 182, at 22,547.
186. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(15)(B).
187. Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 7-81, 47 Fed. Reg. 29,908
(1982).
188. Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 7-81, Change 1, 47 Fed. Reg.
29,904 (1982); see also Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 7-81, Revised
Change 2, 48 Fed. Reg. 37,740 (1983) [hereinafter UIPL No. 7-81, Revised Change 2].
189. Cabais v. Egger, 690 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
190. Id. at 239. In fact, many of the USDOL's interpretations of the pension
provision were challenged on the ground that the USDOL's issuances constituted
substantive rulemaking which did not follow the required rulemaking procedures of
the Administrative Procedures Act. Id. at 237-38. Except for the "take into account"
provision, the court found that the other positions taken by the USDOL were
"interpretative rules" authorized under the Administrative Procedure Act because they
did not create law but were merely statements as to how the agency interprets the
statute. Id. at 238-39. The court in Rivera v. Becerra, 714 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1099 (1984), also found that the USDOL's issuances on the
pension provision constituted interpretive rules, id. at 891, but the "take into account"
provision was not challenged in that case.
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states wide latitude for its implementation."' 9 ' The USDOL
issued a directive reverting to its original position. 192 Thus,
using its normal rules of construction, the USDOL was right
the first time: because the "take into account" provision did not
specify an offset, the matter was properly left to the states.
In part because of this reversal of positions, the reduction
requirement may not be understood completely by the states
to this day, even though clarifying guidance was issued to the
states in 1987.'9' Despite the requirement's apparent broad-
ness, states must reduce UC for the receipt of only a few types
of retirement payments.'94 First, only retirement payments
based on the individual's previous work cause a reduction in
UC.' 95 Thus, disability retirement and survivors' benefits are
not included in its scope, and the states are free to decide how
to treat these amounts. 19 Second, given the "take into account"
provision, only entirely employer-financed retirement payments
are required to be reduced. 19v Contributions to these entirely
employer-financed payments must be made by base-period or
chargeable employers and the services for the employer must
affect eligibility for or increase the amount of the retirement
payment.'98 Thus, the provision only requires receipt of a very
limited group of payments to cause a reduction in UC.
The requirement that UC be reduced due to retirement pay
demonstrates how the USDOL and the courts interpret the
statute to place the least possible burden on the states to the
point where only a few types of pension payments must cause
a reduction in UC. This result has occurred because Congress
revisited and, perhaps without intending it, eviscerated its own
requirement.
IV. ABSOLUTE REQUIREMENTS
The federal requirements discussed so far have left consider-
able discretion to the USDOL. Although these requirements by
191. Cabais, 690 F.2d at 239.
192. UIPL No. 7-81, Revised Change 2, supra note 188.
193. UIPL No. 22-87, supra note 182.
194. Id.
195. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(15) (1994).
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their very existence limit state discretion, the states still have
flexibility to work within these requirements. As discussed in
this Part, "absolute" requirements are different in that federal
and state discretion are, in theory at least, nonexistent. The
absolute character of these requirements is derived from the
law itself, which gives the USDOL no authority to apply the
rules of construction that it uses for minimum requirements.
Because states have no latitude under federal "absolute"
requirements, each state, given the same set of facts, should
make the same determination regarding eligibility.
A. Mandatory Coverage, Equal Treatment, and
the Between and Within Terms Denial
State coverage199 of services is encouraged by the federal tax
offset scheme.200 If services are not covered, then the employer
will not be eligible for the federal tax credit against these
services, and the individual who performed the services will
not be eligible for UC. Because some services were excluded
from the federal tax,2 ' states had no incentive to cover these
services. As a result, Congress took action to require all states
to pay compensation based on two types of excluded services:
those performed for certain nonprofit organizations and those
performed for state and local governmental entities.0 2 Not only
must the states cover these services, but, with specified excep-
tions, UC is to be paid "in the same amount, on the same
terms, and subject to the same conditions as compensation
payable on the basis of other service subject to such law."0 3
This "equal treatment" requirement assures that the coverage
199. "The coverage provisions of State unemployment insurance laws determine
the employers who are liable for contributions and the workers who accrue rights
under the laws." COMPARISON, supra note 89, at 1-1.
200. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
201. See 26 U.S.C. § 3306(c) (1994).
202. See The Employment Security Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-373,
§ 104(a), 84 Stat. 695, 697 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(6)(A) (1994)).
The basic requirement is that states must extend coverage to those services excluded
from the definition of "employment" found in 26 U.S.C. § 3306(c)(7) or (8). 26 U.S.C.
§ 3309(a). Subparts (7) and (8) of § 3306(c) exclude from the term "employment" those
services performed for state and local governmental entities and religious, charitable,
or educational organizations exempt from income tax by reason of § 501(c)(3). The
remaining paragraphs of § 3306(c) and § 3309(b) provide exceptions to this required
coverage provision.
203. Id. § 3304(a)(6)(A).
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requirement is not circumvented through the establishment of
prohibitive eligibility requirements.2' 4
The required coverage and equal treatment provisions are
absolute. They give states no choice but to cover certain
services and no choice but to pay UC under the equal treat-
ment rule.2"5 From a conformity standpoint, these provisions
should be fairly easy to administer: either state law covers the
services and provides for equal treatment or it does not.
This apparent ease of administration did not, however,
prevent litigation involving two states, Alabama and Nevada."'
When Congress modified the required coverage provisions in
1976, it deleted language authorizing an exception for services
performed in the employ of a school that was not an institution
of higher education.20 7 Language permitting the states to
exclude services performed for churches, however, was not
amended.20 8 The USDOL believed that Congress intended to
extend coverage to all nonprofit schools and that the church
exclusion applied only to church, as opposed to school, duties,
and thus it advised states that their laws must extend coverage
to church-related elementary and secondary schools. 2 9 After
a hearing was held on the failure of Alabama and Nevada to
extend this coverage, the Secretary found that such services
were required to be covered and that the two states had
consequently failed to conform to federal law requirements.2 10
The states appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit ruled against the Secretary. 1' At about
the same time, the South Dakota Supreme Court found that
204. See RUBIN, supra note 3, at 101-02.
205. In re The Question of Whether the State of New York's Unemployment
Insurance Law Conforms with the Requirements of the Federal Unemployment Tax
Act 7-11 (June 6, 1975), transmitted by Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No.
24-75 (July 9, 1975) [hereinafter UIPL No. 24-75].
206. See Alabama v. Marshall, 626 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1980). An administrative law
judge made an earlier conformity decision involving New York's exclusion of certain
services from the coverage required under 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(6)(A). See UIPL No.
24-75, supra note 205. This conformity decision eventually became a 1975 Secretary's
decision involving the conformity of New York's exclusion of certain services from the
coverage required under § 3304(a)(6)(A). See id.
207. Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-566,
§ 115(b)(1), 90 Stat. 2667, 2670 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 3309(b)(3)).
208. See 26 U.S.C. § 3309(b)(1).
209. Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 39-78 (May 30, 1978).
210. United States Dep't of Labor v. Alabama Dep't of Indus. Relations 24-25 (Oct.
31, 1979), transmitted by Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 15-80 (Jan.
3, 1980).
211. Alabama v. Marshall, 626 F.2d 366, 368-69 (5th Cir. 1980).
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a provision of state law paralleling federal law required cover-
age of church schools. 212 That case eventually reached the
United States Supreme Court, which ruled that federal law did
not require coverage.213 In his concurring opinion, Justice
Stevens summed up the dilemma that the USDOL faced:
"Although Congress' intention to cover such [church school]
employees was, in my judgment, clear, the 1976 Amendments
simply failed to give effect to that intention .... Congress
removed only one of the two statutory exemptions that, by
their terms, applied to employees of parochial elementary and
secondary schools."2 14
The "between and within terms denial" provisions 215 are
exceptions to the equal treatment requirement. They address
the eligibility of certain individuals who worked for or provided
services to or on behalf of an educational institution or an
educational service agency.216 States are required, or in some
cases authorized, to deny UC based on such educational
employment between academic years or terms and during
vacation periods and holiday recesses within a term if the
individual has a contract or "reasonable assurance" of perform-
ing services in such educational employment in the following
year, term, or remainder of a term.217 Federal law requires
state laws to contain the "between and within terms denial"
provisions for instructional, research, and principal adminis-
trative services for educational institutions and educational
service agencies,21 but the provisions are optional for all other
services performed for such entities as well as for services
provided to or on behalf of such entities.2 19
The denial provision seems to be based on two principles.
First, it was intended to prevent double dipping against the
employer. According to a Senate Finance Committee Report,
212. In re Northwestern Lutheran Academy, 290 N.W.2d 845, 848-49 (S.D. 1980)
(ruling on the requirements of S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 61-1-10.4).
213. St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 788
(1981).
214. Id. at 790.
215. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(6)(A) (1994).
216. See id.
217. See id.
218. Id. § 3304(a)(6)(A)(iii)-(iv). An educational service agency is defined as a
governmental agency or governmental entity which is established and operated
exclusively for the purpose of providing" services to one or more educational institu-
tions. Id. § 3304(a)(6)(A)(iv).
219. See id. § 3304(a)(6)(A)(v)-(vi); see also Unemployment Insurance Program
Letter No. 43-93, 58 Fed. Reg. 52,790 (1993).
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[ilt is common for faculty and other professional employ-
ees of a college or university to be employed pursuant to
an annual contract at an annual salary, but for a work
period of less than 12 months. The annual salaries are
intended to cover the entire year, including the summer
periods, a semester break, a sabbatical period or similar
nonwork periods during which the employment relation-
ship continues.22 °
Second, Congress seemed concerned about whether state
availability provisions would operate to limit UC to teachers
and other individuals genuinely willing to work between or
within terms.22' In this regard, the "between and within terms
denial" is a statutory presumption of unavailability.
The necessity of developing federal interpretations in many
areas of the "between and within terms denial" has been noted
elsewhere.222 The USDOL has had to define terms 2 3 such as
"educational institution,"224 "reasonable assurance, 225 "princi-
pal administrative capacity,"2 '6 and "term."227 The USDOL has
answered the following questions: (1) whether the denial
applies to a school principal who has reasonable assurance of
a teaching job for the coming term; (2) whether the between
terms denial applies if the offer of employment for the second
year is refused; (3) whether reasonable assurance exists when,
for example, 200 individuals are told that they will have em-
ployment but budget cuts permit only 150 jobs to be filled
during the next year or term; (4) how the denial applies to
individuals who worked full-time in the first academic year
but were offered reduced employment for the second year;28
(5) what effect the denial has on substitute teachers; (6)
whether there is reasonable assurance when only the possibili-
ty of employment exists;229 (7) whether UC must be paid
220. S. REP. No. 752, supra note 126, at 16.
221. See RUBIN, supra note 3, at 103.
222. E.g., id. at 105.
223. The following list builds on Rubin's list. See id.
224. 1976 DRAFT LANGUAGE, supra note 159, at 38 & Supp. 4 at 4.
225. 1976 DRAFT LANGUAGE, supra note 159, at 54; Unemployment Insurance
Program Letter No. 4-87, 52 Fed. Reg. 3889 (1987) [hereinafter UIPL No. 4-871.
226. 1976 DRAFT LANGUAGE, supra note 159, at 53.
227. 1976 DRAFT LANGUAGE, supra note 159, Supp. 3 at 4.
228. UIPL No. 4-87, supra note 225, at 3890.
229. Id. at 3890; see also 1976 DRAFT LANGUAGE, supra note 159, Supp. 1 at
18-19.
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retroactively if there is no job available during the succeeding
term;210 (8) how an individual who "crosses over" from one type
of employer to another or from one type of service to another
should be treated;211 (9) whether the denial applies to an
individual who worked for two educational institutions in the
first academic year but who only has a reasonable assurance
of employment from one of the educational institutions for the
second academic year; and (10) whether the denial applies to
an individual who normally works during the summer vaca-
tion on a "year-round" contract but who is offered no work
during the summer.3 2
Determining conformity with the "between and within terms
denial" provisions created problems for the USDOL. Because
the requirements are the same for each state, all states would,
in theory, reach the same conclusion given the same set of
facts, but because of the complexity of the statute, the reality
is that this result does not always occur. In fact, my experi-
ence has been that even officials within a state have reported-
ly disagreed with one another. Because states must determine
claims in a timely manner, they have not had the luxury of
awaiting federal guidance when novel situations arise.233 Thus,
determinations were made before the USDOL even became
aware that an area required its attention.234 Congress seems
230. 1976 DRAFT LANGUAGE, supra note 159, Supp. 1 at 20. For certain services,
Congress modified the position stated in this document with the Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 193, 96 Stat. 324, 408
(amending 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(6)(A)(ii)). See Unemployment Insurance Program
Letter No. 4-83, at 13-19 (Nov. 15, 1982).
231. 1976 DRAFT LANGUAGE, supra note 159, Supp. 3 at 7; Unemployment Insur-
ance Program Letter No. 30-85, 50 Fed. Reg. 48,274, 48,280-81 (1985).
232. The answers to these last two questions have not been distributed to the
states.
233. Once an inquiry on an original matter is received in writing, the USDOL may
take two or more months to respond. States, however, must make payment with "the
greatest promptness that is administratively feasible." 20 C.F.R. § 640.3(a) (1995).
234. Some determinations even took place at the state court level, see, e.g., Mallon
v. Employment Div., 599 P.2d 1164 (Or. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that individuals who
had two instructional jobs in the first academic period only had reasonable assurance
of employment in one of the positions in the second period), and did not come to the
USDOL's attention until another state made a query, see, e.g., Letter from Charles
W. McGlew, Assistant Unemployment Compensation Director, State of Connecticut
Department of Labor, to Walter Baran, Unemployment Insurance Program Specialist,
Boston Regional Office, United States Department of Labor (Nov. 6, 1986) (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). The response to this inquiry
raised no issue and indicated that the USDOL had needed to study this case. See
Letter from Robert J. Semler, Acting Regional Administrator, Employment and
Training Administration, United States Department of Labor, to Eleanor H. Smarz,
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to have had a similar problem concerning areas requiring its
attention-it has amended the "between and within terms
denial" six times since it was created in 1970, often to capture
situations not originally contemplated in the original provi-
235sion.
Thus, the USDOL had two problems: policing state imple-
mentation of the requirements and providing guidance for
every conceivable situation. In some cases, guidance has not
been provided.2 36 Even when the USDOL provides guidance to
individual states, this guidance does not always develop into
an official statement of the USDOL's position through program
letters issued to all states.
The USDOL has dealt with this in part by establishing a
framework for states to handle at least one matter on their
own: whether a reasonable assurance exists where the
Executive Director, Employment Security Division, State of Connecticut Labor
Department 2 (Feb. 18, 1987) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform).
235. The Employment Security Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-373, § 104(a),
84 Stat. 695, 697 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(6) (1994)), added the
original "between terms" denial as a conformity requirement. It applied only to the
period between academic years, only to individuals with a contract, and only to
services performed in a professional, research, or principal administrative capacity.
Id. The Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-566,
§ 115(c), 90 Stat. 2667, 2670, amended 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(6)(A) by adding language
relating to a "reasonable assurance" and by adding clause (ii), which authorized, but
did not require, the application of the denial between terms to all other services
performed by an educational institution, that is, those not performed in a profession-
al, research, or principal administrative capacity. The Emergency Unemployment
Compensation Extension Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-19, § 302(c), 91 Stat. 39, 44,
amended clause (i) to clarify that the denial applied between terms as well as
between academic years and added clause (iii) to authorize, but not require, the
denial for vacation and holiday periods within terms or academic years. Pub. L. No.
95-171, § 2, 91 Stat. 1353, 1353 (1977), added clause (iv) to authorize, but not require,
the "between and within terms" denial for services performed for governmental
agencies or entities, called educational service agencies, established and operated
exclusively for the purposes of providing services to one or more educational institu-
tions. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248,
§ 193, 96 Stat. 324, 408, added subclause (II) to clause (ii) to provide for the retroac-
tive payment of compensation in certain cases where the individual is not offered an
opportunity to perform such services in the second academic year or term. The Social
Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 521, 97 Stat. 65, 147, required
state law to include the previously optional clauses (ii)(I), (iii), and (iv) and added
clause (v) authorizing, but not requiring, the denial when services were provided to
or on behalf of an educational institution by any governmental entity or nonprofit
organization. The Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-164, § 302(a), 105 Stat. 1049, 1059, made the denial optional for those services
not performed in an instructional, research, or principal administrative capacity.
This, in effect, repealed significant parts of the 1983 amendments.
236. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
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individual worked a certain number of hours in the first
academic period and has been advised that the number of
hours to be worked in the second academic year would be
substantially lower.237 The USDOL was concerned that, in this
instance, the "between and within terms denial" was pro-
ducing absurd results.238 Therefore, providing the states some
flexibility might be desirable. After studying the issue, the
USDOL provided guidance, stating that
[r]easonable assurance exists only if the economic terms
and conditions of the job offered in the second period are
not substantially less (as determined under State law)
than the terms and conditions for the job in the first
period. This position modifies that stated on page 23 of
Supplement 5, of the Draft Legislation.239
The position that was modified was that the suitability of
the work-in other words, the economic terms and condi-
tions-could not be considered in determining whether a
reasonable assurance existed.240 Under the new position, the
237. See UIPL No. 4-87, supra note 225, at 3890.
238. See Leissring v. Department of Indus., Labor and Human Relations, 340
N.W.2d 533 (Wis. 1983). The case provides an example of two similar situations
leading to different results. One involved a full-time teacher who was laid off
following the academic year and told that she would be placed on the substitute
teaching list for the following year; however, she was not told how often, if ever, she
could be expected to be called on to substitute. Id. at 534-35. She was originally
denied benefits. Id. at 535. The second situation involved a teacher who was em-
ployed full-time and who also taught driver education for an additional hour each
day. Id. This teacher also was laid off and then offered a one-hour-per-day job from
the same school teaching driver education. Id. He was found eligible for benefits. Id.
at 535-36. The Leissring court concluded that UC was due to both individuals. Id. at
541. The USDOL agreed with the court's decision. See UIPL No. 4-87, supra note 225,
at 3890. The Leissring court noted that the plaintiffs were in a
far different situation than the teacher who can look forward to resuming his
or her full-time employment in the fall .... [Each plaintiff is] not seeking
benefits simply because he or she wants a subsidized summer vacation. Such
benefits would likely be needed to meet current and future living expenses and
to defray the expenses of seeking new employment. These are precisely the type
of circumstances for which unemployment compensation has traditionally been
intended.
340 N.W.2d at 540.
239. UIPL No. 4-87, supra note 225, at 3890. The reference to the "Draft Legisla-
tion" is to the 1976 DRAFT LANGUAGE, supra note 159, Supp. 5 at 23. The "economic
terms and conditions" test was based on a similar test found in Paynes v. Detroit
Board of Education, 388 N.W.2d 358, 366 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
240. See 1976 DRAFT LANGUAGE, supra note 159, Supp. 5 at 23.
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economic terms and conditions had to be considered and
would be "determined under state law."241 Thus, under this
"absolute" federal requirement, the USDOL established a
framework that, in its view, reasonably effectuated the
purpose of the between and within terms denial by allowing
states to reach different conclusions given the same set of
facts. Ironically, this was done by placing a requirement, not
plainly evident in federal law, on the states.242
In summary, the required coverage and equal treatment
provisions should, notwithstanding a matter ultimately re-
solved by the United States Supreme Court, be administered
fairly easily at the federal level. The "between and within
terms denial," however, assumes a level of federal involve-
ment that is difficult to maintain because the USDOL would
be required to provide guidance on every between and within
terms situation so that every state, given the same set of
facts, would reach the same conclusions. The USDOL has,
therefore, in one case established a framework with which
states may make determinations under state law.
B. The Extended Benefit Work Search
During periods of high unemployment, states are required
to pay extended benefits (EB) to individuals who have ex-
hausted regular UC.243 Because the federal government shares
the cost of EB,244 it has a more active interest in EB eligibili-
ty, with the result that federal law contains special eligibility
requirements that states must require individuals to meet. 245
Some of these requirements are minimums; some are abso-
lutes.
241. UIPL No. 4-87, supra note 225, at 3890.
242. See 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(6)(A)(i) (1994). The provision applies only "if there
is a contract or reasonable assurance" of performing services in the second academic
period. Id. Section 3304(a)(6)(A) makes no mention of "economic terms and condi-
tions."
243. Id. § 3304(a)(11); Federal-State Extended Unemployment Compensation Act
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-373, §§ 201-207, 84 Stat. 708, 708-13, reprinted as amended
in 26 U.S.C. § 3304 app. at 467-71.
244. Federal-State Extended Unemployment Act of 1970, § 204, 84 Stat. at 711,
reprinted as amended in 26 U.S.C. § 3304 app. at 469-70.
245. Id. § 202(a)(3)-(5), as amended by Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-499, § 1024, 94 Stat. 2599, 2658-60, reprinted as amended in 26 U.S.C.
§ 3304 app. at 467-68.
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Federal law requires that, to be eligible for EB, an individu-
al must have twenty weeks of "full-time" insured employment
in the base period or the equivalent. 246 The equivalent was
defined by law as insured wages that exceed forty times the
individual's most recent weekly benefit amount or one and
one-half times the individual's insured wages in the calendar
quarter of the base period in which the individual's insured
wages were the highest.247 The USDOL, providing a very
liberal interpretation, accepted "full time" as meaning "the
meaning provided by the State law."248
The asserted theory behind this earnings requirement is that
individuals employed for fewer than twenty weeks should not
collect UC beyond twenty-six weeks.249 In fact, it appears to
have been based more on federal budgetary considerations.25 °
From the federal perspective, this provision is relatively easy
to administer: either state laws contain the appropriate quali-
fying requirement or they do not.
Another EB requirement is a special work search require-
ment, which was apparently added to federal law on the
premise that individuals who do not look for work will not find
work.251 Again, the real reason seems to have been budget
considerations.252 Under the work search requirement, an
individual shall be treated as actively engaged in seeking work
only if the individual has engaged in a "systematic and sus-
tained effort" to obtain work during the week claimed.253
246. Id. § 202(a)(5), as amended by 94 Stat. at 2660, reprinted as amended in 26
U.S.C. § 3304 app. at 468.
247. Id.
248. 20 C.F.R. § 615.4(b)(3) (1995).
249. Administration's Proposed Savings in Unemployment Compensation, Public
Assistance, and Social Services Programs, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Public
Assistance and Unemployment Compensation of the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 160 (1981) (statement of Lawrence E. Weatherford, Acting
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Employment and Training, United States Department
of Labor).
250. See Joseph E. Hight, Unemployment Insurance: Changes in the Federal-State
Balance, 59 U. DET. J. URB. L. 615, 626-27 (1982).
251. RUBIN, supra note 3, at 115. Supporters of the amendment argued that "the
claimants affected were long term unemployed and, therefore, lacking in initiative."
Id.
252. See id.
253. See 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(11) (1994); Federal-State Extended Unemployment
Compensation Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-373, § 202(a)(3), 84 Stat. 708, amended by
Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, § 1024, 94 Stat. 2599, 2658,
reprinted as amended in 26 U.S.C. § 3304 app. at 467-68.
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The USDOL's regulations use almost an entire column in the
Code of Federal Regulations to define "a systematic and
sustained effort."254 In part, the regulations require "[a] high
level ofjob search activity throughout the given week, compat-
ible with the number of employers and employment opportuni-
ties in the labor market reasonably applicable to the
individual";255 "[a] plan of search for work ... which results in
contacts with persons who have the authority to hire or which
follows whatever hiring procedure is required by a prospective
employer";256 "[aictions by the individual comparable to those
actions by which jobs are being found by people in the commu-
nity and labor market";257 and "[a] search not limited to classes
of work or rates of pay to which the individual is accus-
tomed. 258
All states should, in theory, reach the same conclusion as to
whether an individual meets the "systematic and sustained
effort" requirement when presented with the same set of facts.
Given this reasoning, it is notable that the regulations do not
give any clear guidance as to what action must be taken in a
specific situation. For example, given the same set of facts in
different states, it might be expected that the same minimum
number of work search contacts would be required, but the
USDOL has never said what this number is. What is an
adequate plan for the search of work? Again, the USDOL has
never said. The regulation's focus on the local labor market
gives the states great latitude. Each local labor market is
unique, and, in order to challenge a specific determination
successfully, the USDOL would have to become at least as
expert in the local labor market as the state. This is highly
unlikely. What is required of the states is that they determine
whether an individual is conducting a "systematic and sus-
tained effort" within a framework established by the USDOL.259
The result is that the actual application may be expected to
vary widely from state to state.
Such treatment of this type of "absolute" requirement is
probably inevitable. The USDOL has neither the resources nor
the expertise to provide guidance on every situation or monitor
254. 20 C.F.R. § 615.2(o)(8) (1995).
255. Id. § 615.2(o)(8)(i).
256. Id. § 615.2(o)(8)(ii).
257. Id. § 615.2(o)(8)(iii).
258. Id. § 615.2(o)(8)(iv).
259. 20 C.F.R. §§ 615.2(o), 615.8(g)(1) (1995).
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every determination. Furthermore, because the determinations
are made by the state under state law, the only way for the
states to correct problems is to ignore their own precedents
consistently or to amend their laws to reverse the precedents.
Therefore, an accommodation is made which, in the USDOL's
view, reasonably effectuates the federal requirement. That
accommodation is to require the states to work within a
framework that, although supposedly absolute, actually gives
them considerable latitude.
C. The Deposit and Withdrawal Standards
The UC system is a trust system in which the trustee-the
Secretary of the Treasury-holds moneys in trust for the
beneficiaries, the state agencies administering the state UC
laws.26 ° This trust relationship is a curious one in that the
beneficiaries actually collect and disburse the funds.2"' The
trustee's role, at least concerning the actual handling of the
funds, is merely to invest and hold the funds until such time
as they are needed.
The deposit and withdrawal standards, which were part of
the original Social Security Act of 1935,262 impose restrictions
on the beneficiaries concerning the use of the trust's moneys
to assure that the purpose of the trust-relief against the
hazards of unemployment-is accomplished.263 They do this by
governing the treatment of trust moneys while in the hands of
the beneficiary. The deposit standard requires that "all money
received in the unemployment fund shall ... immediately upon
260. S. REP. No. 628, supra note 21, at 47. Congress instituted federal rather than
state trusteeship so that, "[wihen depression set[] in, the funds [could] be liquidated
without actual sale of the securities on the markets, and ... the net effect [would]
be to maintain purchasing power without any offsetting effects toward deflation." Id.
at 15. The report itself refers to the state agencies as "the beneficiaries." Id. at 47.
261. NCUC REPORT, supra note 3, at 18 (noting that "[sitate taxes finance the full
cost of regular [UCI benefits").
262. The Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, § 303, 49 Stat. 620, 626 (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 503 (1994)).
263. "The essential idea in unemployment compensation is the creation of reserves
during periods of employment from which compensation is paid to workmen who lose
their positions when employment slackens and who cannot find other work." S. REP.
No. 628, supra note 21, at 11. Limitations on fund moneys by the states assures that
the funds will be there rather than siphoned off to some other purpose. The with-
drawal standard is vital to maintaining the integrity of State unemployment funds.
Since 1935 this provision has prevented the dispersion of this money for a variety of
purpose other than to pay compensation.
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such receipt be paid over to the [United States] Secretary of
the Treasury to the credit of the Unemployment Trust Fund."264
The "withdrawal standard" requires, with specified exceptions,
that "all money withdrawn from the unemployment fund of the
State shall be used solely in the payment of unemployment
compensation, exclusive of expenses of administration."265
The scope of the deposit and withdrawal standards is consid-
erable. Together, they serve as the basis for timeliness re-
quirements related to the length of time unemployment fund
moneys are actually in the hands of the state. 6 Also, together
the provisions determine when moneys become and cease to be
a part of the state's unemployment fund. By itself, the with-
drawal standard limits withdrawals from the state's unem-
ployment fund267 and has served as the basis for requiring or
prohibiting certain eligibility requirements. 26 '8 Both provisions
have been construed narrowly by the USDOL; 26 9 exceptions are
allowed only as required by law.2
The deposit and withdrawal standards tend to be the federal
requirements that the USDOL takes most seriously, as they
are the most fundamental to the federal-state system. This
section discusses how these provisions have been interpreted
and applied, using two examples which illustrate how the
USDOL negotiates and resolves issues of conformity and
compliance.
264. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(3) (1994). The same deposit requirement is found in 42
U.S.C. § 503(a)(4) (1994).
265. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(4). The same withdrawal requirement is found in 42
U.S.C. § 503(a)(5). "Compensation" is defined as "cash benefits payable to individuals
with respect to their unemployment." 26 U.S.C. § 3306(h). "Unemployment fund" is
defined, in part, as a "special fund, established under a State law and administered
by a State agency, for the payment of compensation." Id. § 3306(f). Basically, the
state's unemployment fund contains three identifiable components: (1) a clearing
account for deposit of employer remittances, (2) the state's account in the Unemploy-
ment Trust Fund established by 42 U.S.C. § 1104, and (3) a benefit payment account
for the payment of UC. See State Unemployment Fund Cash Management Program,
55 Fed. Reg. 20,404, 20,404 (1990).
266. See 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(3), (4) (1994).
267. See Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 11-92, 57 Fed. Reg. 7795,
7795-96 (1992) [hereinafter UIPL No. 11-92].
268. See Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 45-89, 55 Fed. Reg. 1886,
1887 (1990) [hereinafter UIPL No. 45-891. The withdrawal standard has also prohibit-
ed needs testing as a condition of UC eligibility. Unemployment Insurance Program
Letter No. 787 (Oct. 2, 1964) (adopting the decision of In re Hearing to the South
Dakota Department of Employment Security Pursuant to Section 3304(c) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 29 Fed. Reg. 7621 (1964)).
269. See UIPL No. 45-89, supra note 268.
270. UIPL No. 11-92, supra note 267, at 7796.
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1. Withdrawal for Health Care Purposes-On July 1, 1989,
New Jersey enacted its annual appropriation bill for the 1990
fiscal year. 171 Section 30 of the Act created a new state account
called the "Uncompensated Care Offset Account" for purposes
of paying certain health-related expenses.272 Section 30 also
provided for an appropriation to the Uncompensated Care
Offset Account from worker contributions in the clearing
account, which was part of the state's unemployment fund. 3
On August 2, 1989, the USDOL notified New Jersey of its
concerns that section 30 appeared on its face to conflict with
the requirements of the deposit and withdrawal standards. 4
The USDOL's position, which would be amplified in subsequent
correspondence, was that under the deposit standard unem-
ployment taxes are "received in" the state's unemployment
fund at the instant of their receipt by the state or its agent
and, therefore, were required to be deposited immediately in
the state's account in the Unemployment Trust Fund.275 Thus,
funds that are received by a state as unemployment taxes may
not, consistent with the deposit or withdrawal standard, be
diverted or reappropriated to some other purpose.
After New Jersey failed to respond, the USDOL sent a
gauntlet letter276 on August 28, 1989.277 New Jersey responded
271. 1989 N.J. Laws 122.
272. Id.
273. Section 30 provided for an appropriation "from those proceeds that would
otherwise be deposited in the clearing account established pursuant to [N.J. REV.
STAT. §1 43:21-9(b), moneys in an amount equal to 40% of employee contributions
received in this fiscal year pursuant to [N.J. REv. STAT. §] 43:21-1 et seq. or
$100,000,000 whichever is greater, notwithstanding any other provisions of [N.J. REV.
STAT. §] 43:21-1 et seq." Id. Section 43:21-9(b) addressed the administration of the
unemployment fund by the State Treasurer, providing that "[aIll moneys payable to
the fund, upon receipt thereof by the [New Jersey) [Department [of Labor], shall be
forwarded to the treasurer, who shall immediately deposit them in the clearing
account." N.J. REV. STAT. § 43:21-9(b) (1994). Under the same section, the clearing
account was a part of the State's unemployment fund. See id. New Jersey law also
provided that "each worker shall contribute to the [unemployment] fund 1% of his
wages." See id. § 43:21-7(d)(1)(A).
274. Letter from Thomas E. Hill, Regional Administrator, Employment and
Training Administration, United States Department of Labor, to Charles Serraino,
Commissioner, New Jersey Department of Labor 1 (Aug. 2, 1989) (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
275. Id. The position is restated in a letter from Roberts T. Jones, Assistant
Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, to Charles Serraino, Commis-
sioner, New Jersey Department of Labor 1-2 (Dec. 1, 1989) (on file with the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
276. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
277. Letter from Roberts T. Jones, Assistant Secretary of Labor, United States
Department of Labor, to Charles Serraino, Commissioner, New Jersey Department
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on September 12,278 and the parties met on September 21.279
As a result of the meeting, an October 25, 1989, letter from the
USDOL offered New Jersey the opportunity to resolve the issue
by issuing an Attorney General's opinion stating that section
30 did not merely appropriate moneys-it also established a
new tax on the worker payable to the Uncompensated Care
Offset Account while the UC tax on the worker was reduced.28 °
If section 30 accomplished this purpose, then the moneys
appropriated for health care purposes were never "received in"
the state's unemployment fund and federal requirements did
not apply to these moneys.
The offer of resolution through an Attorney General's opin-
ion was based on the fact that conformity issues exist only if
state law conflicts with federal requirements. 28' Therefore, if
a state interprets its law in such a way that no conflict exists,
then there is no conformity issue. This approach is appropriate
for ambiguous provisions of state law. Although reasonable
people may differ as to what is an "ambiguous" provision of
state law, section 30 on its face was an appropriation that did
not establish a new tax.282 Further, the state's constitution
limited the purpose of a legislative enactment to a single
purpose,283 which in this case was appropriation of funds, not
the creation of a new tax. Thus, offering a state the opportuni-
ty to resolve the issue through an interpretation of its law
of Labor (Aug. 28, 1989) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform).
278. Letter from Charles Serraino, Commissioner, New Jersey Department of
Labor, to Roberts T. Jones, Assistant Secretary of Labor, United States Department
of Labor (Sept. 12, 1989) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform).
279. See Letter from Roberts T. Jones, Assistant Secretary of Labor, United States
Department of Labor, to Charles Serraino, Commissioner, New Jersey Department
of Labor 1 (Oct. 25, 1989) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform).
280. Id. at 1-2.
281. Id. at 2.
282. Section 30 stated that funds were to be "appropriated... from those proceeds
that would otherwise be deposited in the clearing account" of the state's unemploy-
ment fund. 1989 N.J. Laws 122. There is no mention of a new tax. Section 30 also
capped the amount appropriated to "40% of employee contributions received ... or
$100,000,000, whichever is greater." Id. This capping formula suggests the deter-
mination of the amount appropriated is made only after employee contributions are
received, thereby indicating a redirection of funds.
283. The New Jersey Constitution provides that, "[t]o avoid improper influences
which may result from intermixing in one and the same act such things as have no
proper relation to each other, every law shall embrace but one object, and that shall
be expressed in the title." N.J. CONST. art. 4, § 7, para. 4.
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could be viewed as permitting the state to pay lip service to
federal law while circumventing it.
New Jersey provided an opinion as requested by the
USDOL.28 4 New Jersey based its interpretation of its law on
the theory that all funds from all sources arrive in the state
general fund in an inchoate state and may be appropriated for
whatever purposes the state legislature chooses. 285 Additional-
ly, in New Jersey's view, there were no federal provisions
relating to the allocation of tax proceeds prior to their deposit
into a state's unemployment fund. 28" The New Jersey Attorney
General stated that the moneys in question were not "received
in" the fund as required by the deposit standard; therefore, no
federal requirements applied.28 7 In other words, moneys re-
ceived as UC tax payments from employers did not become a
part of the state's unemployment fund, and therefore subject
to the deposit requirement, until some administrative action
of the state placed them in a certain account.
In the USDOL's view, this interpretation would nullify the
deposit requirement: instead of guaranteeing that moneys
received by the state as unemployment contributions were
used for the payment of UC in accordance with the trust, the
use of the moneys would be entirely at the state's discretion.28 8
The USDOL therefore raised a new conformity issue concern-
ing when moneys became a part of the state's unemployment
fund. 2 9 The issue was raised because, in New Jersey's view,
its law did not consider amounts received as UC contributions
automatically to be part of its unemployment fund.29 °
Neither the New Jersey opinion letter nor its supplement
provided the USDOL with an opinion unequivocally stating
284. Letter from Peter N. Perretti, Jr., New Jersey Attorney General, to Roberts
T. Jones, Assistant Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor (Nov. 14,
1989) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter
Opinion Letter]; see also Letter from Peter N. Perretti, Jr., New Jersey Attorney
General, to Roberts T. Jones, Assistant Secretary of Labor, United States Department
of Labor (Dec. 15, 1989) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform) (supplementing the Opinion Letter, supra).
285. Opinion Letter, supra note 284, at 5.
286. Id. at 3.
287. Id. at 4.
288. It is important to note that nothing in federal law dictates the amounts the
state requires employers and employees to pay into its unemployment fund. However,
in the USDOL's view, amounts received as UC contributions are subject to the
immediate deposit and withdrawal standards. Letter from Roberts T. Jones to
Charles Serraino, supra, note 277, at 1-3.
289. Letter from Roberts T. Jones to Charles Serraino, supra note 275, at 1-2.
290. See id.
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that there was a change in the tax structure.291 Instead, the
language of the opinions appeared to apply to allocation of
revenue.29 2 Although New Jersey was given a third chance to
provide an opinion,293 the issue was resolved when New Jersey
and the USDOL entered into an agreement on July 20,
1990.294 Under the agreement, section 30 was deemed to be
moot because it was applicable only with respect to the 1990
appropriation year, which had expired by the time the agree-
ment was signed.295 Although this resolved the conformity
issue created by section 30, the compliance issue remained
because unemployment fund moneys remained outside the
fund. 29' Therefore, New Jersey agreed to pay an amount equal
to the actual amount appropriated under section 30 plus
interest at the rate earned by the Unemployment Trust
Fund.297 Because the moneys had already been disbursed, New
Jersey was allowed to pay the amounts over a period of
time. 29' The final payment was made on September 30, 1994.
The end result was that one hundred million dollars was
repaid to the state's unemployment fund along with nearly
forty million dollars in interest. 299 The agreement did not
address the related conformity issue, raised by the Attorney
General's opinions, of when moneys become part of the state's
291. See supra note 284.
292. See Letter from Roberts T. Jones, Assistant Secretary of Labor, United States
Department of Labor, to Raymond L. Bramucci, Commissioner, New Jersey Depart-
ment of Labor 1-2 (Jan. 30, 1990) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal
of Law Reform).
293. Id. at 3.
294. Agreement Between the United States Department of Labor and The State
of New Jersey (July 20, 1990) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform) [hereinafter Agreement].
295. Id. art. 6(e).
296. See supra text accompanying notes 24-33 (distinguishing between conformity
and compliance).
297. Agreement, supra note 294, art. 7(a).
298. Id. art. 6(d).
299. The payments were $37,512,183.77 and $101,756,061.53, for a total of
$139,268,245.30. See Letter from Raymond L. Bramucci, Commissioner, New Jersey
Department of Labor, to Thomas E. Hill, Regional Administrator, Employment and
Training Administration, United States Department of Labor (Oct. 5, 1992) (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Letter from Peter J.
Calderone, Commissioner, New Jersey Department of Labor, to Thomas Hill,
Regional Administrator, Employment and Training Administration, United States
Department of Labor (Sept. 30, 1994) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal
of Law Reform).
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unemployment fund.30 0 This issue was resolved when the
Attorney General's opinions were withdrawn. °1
New Jersey was not listed on the October 31, 1989, certifica-
tions for tax credit.0 2 Because there had been no hearing or
Secretary's decision, and the appeals process had not been
exhausted (much less begun), this did not constitute an actual
withholding of certifications; instead, the Secretary described
New Jersey as being omitted because of unresolved issues.30 3
Under the agreement, New Jersey agreed to its continued
omission from the annual certifications for tax credit until its
obligations under the agreement were fulfilled, provided that
no other issues existed with respect to such certification.3 °4
Therefore, in addition to the 1989 omission, New Jersey was
omitted from the certifications for tax credit from 1990
through 1993.305 Certification for 1989 was issued in 1992;306
certifications for the remaining years were issued in 1994.307
2. Withdrawal for Administrative Purposes-In 1990,
Colorado lowered UC taxes and established a separate Em-
ployment Support Fund to be used for funding administrative
expenses. 30 8 The legislation was retroactive: it was applicable
with respect to all of calendar year 1990 even though it was
not approved until June 8, 1990. The USDOL raised an issue
with this retroactivity under the withdrawal standard stating
that amounts properly paid into a state's unemployment fund
under provisions of law then in effect may not be transferred
300. Agreement, supra note 294, art. 6(e).
301. Letter from Robert J. Del Tufo, New Jersey Attorney General, to Raymond
L. Bramucci, Commissioner, New Jersey Department of Labor (Oct. 1, 1991), enclosed
with Letter from Raymond L. Bramucci, Commissioner, New Jersey Department of
Labor, to Roberts T. Jones, Assistant Secretary of Labor, United States Department
of Labor (Oct. 8, 1991) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform).
302. 54 Fed. Reg. 46,660 (1989).
303. Id.
304. See Agreement, supra note 294, art. 7(d).
305. 58 Fed. Reg. 59,071 (1993); 57 Fed. Reg. 53,143 (1992); 56 Fed. Reg. 57,024
(1991); 55 Fed. Reg. 46,739 (1990).
306. 57 Fed. Reg. 53,143 (1992).
307. 59 Fed. Reg. 55,494 (1994). Because all amounts withdrawn to pay health
costs during the 1989 certification period were repaid in 1992, under the Agreement,
the certification with respect to that period was issued in 1992. See Agreement, supra
note 294, at art. 7(a), (d). Amounts withdrawn to pay health costs during the 1990
certification period were not repaid until 1994, at which time the 1990 and subse-
quent certifications were made.
308. 1990 Colo. Sess. Laws 1766 (codified as amended at COLO. REv. STAT. § 8-77-
109 (Supp. 1995)).
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to another fund because of a retroactive amendment. 0 9 As was
the case in New Jersey, the USDOL argued that amounts were
received in the state's unemployment fund at the instant of
receipt by the state or its agent and could be used only for
purposes authorized under federal law.
310
Colorado at first acknowledged that moneys received prior
to June 8, 1990, were being used for administrative expenses
and that such moneys would be restored to the unemployment
fund.3 1' Thus, Colorado appeared to admit that unemployment
funds had been used for an impermissible purpose, namely the
payment of administrative costs. Colorado later resisted de-
mands requiring repayment, arguing that, because the
Colorado legislature has the authority to determine the effec-
tive date of legislation, the amounts were "erroneously paid
into the unemployment fund."312 Colorado also argued that the
amounts withdrawn were "from the clearing account .. not
... from the unemployment fund."313 The USDOL responded
that retroactive amendments do not constitute "erroneous
payments," as the amounts were paid into the state's unem-
ployment fund in accordance with the law in effect at the
time.3 " The USDOL also stated that, as was the case in New
309. See Letter from Luis Sepulveda, Regional Administrator, Employment and
Training Administration, United States Department of Labor, to John J. Donlon,
Executive Director, Colorado Department of Labor and Employment 1 (Jan. 16, 1991)
(on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). An earlier memoran-
dum from Donald J. Kulick, Administrator for Regional Management, United States
Department of Labor, to Luis Sepulveda, Regional Administrator, Employment and
Training Administration,United States Department of Labor 2 (July 23, 1990) (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), also made the same point.
Although not transmitted in writing to Colorado, the memorandum was apparently
shared with the Colorado agency, which responded to "national office questions" in
a letter from John J. Donlon, Executive Director, Colorado Department of Labor and
Employment, to Luis Sepulveda, Regional Administrator, Employment and Training
Administration, United States Department of Labor (Sept. 19, 1990) (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
310. See Letter from Luis Sepulveda to John J. Donlon, supra note 309, at 2;
Memorandum from Donald J. Kulick to Luis Sepulveda, supra note 309, at 1.
311. See Letter from John J. Donlon to Luis Sepulveda, supra note 309, at 1.
312. Letter from John J. Donlon, Executive Director, Colorado Department of
Labor and Employment, to Luis Sepulveda, Regional Administrator, Employment and
Training Administration, United States Department of Labor 1 (Dec. 26, 1990) (on
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
313. Id.
314. Letter from Luis Sepulveda to John J. Donlon, supra note 309, at 1-2. The
USDOL has since published a position concerning "sums erroneously paid into" a
state's unemployment fund that is consistent with the position taken with Colorado.
See UIPL No. 11-92, supra note 267, at 7796 ("Sums are 'erroneously paid' into the
fund only if an error is made by the employer, his agent or the State agency which
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Jersey, the amounts were received in the state's unemploy-
ment fund at the instant of receipt by any agency or agent of
the state and could only be used for purposes authorized under
federal law.315 It was irrelevant that the withdrawal was made
from the clearing account because "moneys in the clearing
account [had] already been 'received in' the State's unemploy-
ment fund." 1'
As the facts developed, the USDOL learned that Colorado
had withdrawn about $1.95 million from its unemployment
fund because of the retroactive application." 7 In addition,
another $2.1 million had been withdrawn to pay administra-
tive expenses.3 8 By the time the USDOL learned of it, this
latter amount had been repaid to the state's unemployment
fund. The USDOL demanded the payment of the $1.95 million
"retroactive" amount with interest to the unemployment fund
as well as interest on the $2.1 million "loan" amount.319 Colo-
rado eventually complied with this demand. 20
Colorado's use of the unemployment fund to pay administra-
tive expenses gave rise to an additional issue concerning
whether Colorado interpreted its law to permit the withdrawal
of amounts from the state's unemployment fund for adminis-
trative purposes. On its face, Colorado law did not appear to
allow such a withdrawal; 321 however, because the withdrawal
had been made, a question arose concerning whether Colorado
law meant what it seemed to say. The state was asked to pro-
vide an Attorney General's opinion stating that such actions
were not authorized by law.322 The state did not do so, saying
that it did not interpret its law to permit withdrawals from
the unemployment fund for purposes other than the payment
results in an amount being paid into the fund which was not required by the State
law in effect at the time the payment was made.").
315. Letter from Luis Sepulveda to John J. Donlon, supra note 309, at 2.
316. Id.
317. Letter from Luis Sepulveda, Regional Administrator, Employment and
Training Administration, United States Department of Labor, to John J. Donlon,
Executive Director, Colorado Department of Labor and Employment 1-2 (Apr. 24,
1991) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
318. Id.
319. Id. at 2-3.
320. See Letter from John J. Donlon, Executive Director, Colorado Department of
Labor and Employment, to Luis Sepulveda, Regional Administrator, Employment and
Training Administration, United States Department of Labor (Sept. 24, 1991) (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
321. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 8-77-104(1) (1986) ("Expenditures from the benefit
account shall be made by the division solely by the payment of benefits.").
322. Letter from Luis Sepulveda to John J. Donlon, supra note 317, at 3.
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of UC and that the expense involved in acquiring the opinion
was not justified.323 Thus, the contradiction remained; Colora-
do law did not permit a certain action, and yet the state had
taken that action. For the USDOL, the question of conformity
still was not resolved satisfactorily.
The matter finally came to closure on April 24, 1992, when
the USDOL, by certified letter, advised the state that it ac-
cepted Colorado's statement that state law did not permit
withdrawals for purposes other than the payment of compen-
sation and that, therefore, the withdrawal was not authorized
under state law.32 4 The letter also advised that, in the future,
if the USDOL had any reason to believe that Colorado made
any similar withdrawals, the matter would be referred directly
to the Assistant Secretary,325 implying that immediate action
would be taken to withhold certifications.
3. Summary-These examples illustrate some common
issues in conformity and compliance. From the federal perspec-
tive, the USDOL could claim that federal law had protected
the states' unemployment funds because, in the end, both
funds were made whole. Further, the operation of the UC
programs in both states was not jeopardized by withholding
certifications. By avoiding time-consuming and costly adminis-
trative and judicial proceedings, the USDOL was free to focus
on other issues.32 On the other hand, both states temporarily
obtained the use of state unemployment fund moneys, and
neither state suffered for its actions. Therefore, it could be
argued that the process of informal resolution and the lack of
any withholding of grants or tax credits only serves as an
incentive for states to ignore federal requirements temporarily
or to enter into a process that serves to delay resolution. New
Jersey, for example, used the unemployment fund moneys for
about five years.327
323. See Letter from John J. Donlon, Executive Director, Colorado Department of
Labor and Employment, to Luis Sepulveda, Regional Administrator, Employment and
Training Administration, United States Department of Labor (Jan. 14, 1992) (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
324. Letter from Luis Sepulveda, Regional Administrator, Employment and
Training Administration, United States Department of Labor, to John J. Donlon,
Executive Director, Colorado Department of Labor and Employment 1 (Apr. 24, 1992)
(on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
325. Id. at 2.
326. Avoiding litigation also, of course, had the additional benefit of not placing
the USDOL's interpretation at risk.
327. See supra Part IV.C.1.
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From the states' point of view, the limitation imposed by the
federal requirements appeared inappropriate. Both New
Jersey and Colorado claimed that their legislatures possessed
sole authority to take actions such as allocating resources or
establishing effective dates. In the USDOL's view, this misses
the point. In neither case was the state legislature's authority
ever in question; the question was whether the legislatures'
actions jeopardized the benefits available under the federal-
state UC system.
Both examples are, in one regard, atypical. Of the eighty-
three conformity issues resolved informally from 1992 through
1994,28 only these two required state action to correct
retroactive compliance issues.329 Exceptions to federal law
requirements often continue to be applied while the USDOL
and the state negotiate resolution of the issue; this is
generally a matter of a state being obliged to follow its law
and courts. If the state is unwilling to change its position, the
USDOL's failure to compel compliance solutions may encour-
age states to prolong negotiations.
There are at least two reasons for not requiring compliance
solutions. First, resolving compliance issues involves identify-
ing a compliance solution and monitoring its implementation.33 °
Resources are not always available for these activities.33'
Second, compliance solutions may be difficult to identify and
implement. The New Jersey and Colorado cases offered a
comparatively easy solution: making states' unemployment
funds whole. However, if a payment is properly made under a
provision of state law that is inconsistent with federal law, the
328. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
329. The use of administrative discretion in resolving issues is discussed by
Wagman, supra note 29, at 57-61. It should be noted that, in some cases, there were
no compliance issues to correct because the states had voluntarily administered their
laws consistent with federal requirements once the USDOL raised an issue.
330. See id. at 33-55 (discussing a conformity/compliance proceeding which
resulted in a state redetermining claims for individuals who were denied UC
inconsistent with federal law).
331. RUBIN, supra note 3, at 30 (noting that the number of federal staff in
Washington has declined even though the USDOL is responsible for administering
more standards). Rubin also stated that, "[als of 1983, a staff of two or three skilled
legislative analysts" was responsible for reviewing state legislation, negotiating the
resolution of issues, and for "developing support for" the USDOL's position in a
hearing. Id. at 130-31 (noting that the analysts are also responsible for issuing
guidance to states concerning federal requirements). Although Rubin's comments were
aimed at conformity, the analysts are also responsible for finding compliance solutions.
I supervise the analysts responsible for these activities, and, as of 1996, the situation
remains much the same as Rubin described it.
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situation is different. The USDOL would not likely require the
state to force the individual to pay back money properly
received under the state's law.
The exercise of discretion in not resolving every compliance
issue may be an operational necessity, but it does raise ques-
tions about the protection ostensibly offered by federal UC
law. If UC has been denied under provisions of state law
inconsistent with federal law, and the USDOL does not re-
quire correction of the compliance issue, then it would appear
that a primary purpose of the federal law-the protection of
those who look to it for such protection 33 2-is not fulfilled.
Similarly, if an amount is properly paid under a state law
provision inconsistent with federal law, then the unemploy-
ment fund and the employers and employees who finance the
fund have not been protected from an expense that should not
have been incurred.
CONCLUSION
When it can, the USDOL interprets federal law require-
ments to leave discretion to the states while still reasonably
effectuating the statute. The USDOL follows this approach
because it takes seriously the notion that states are free to
operate their own UC programs without dictation from Wash-
ington.
What reasonably effectuates a statute will always be an area
of dispute. Due to its relatively infrequent use by the USDOL,
the meaning of the "methods of administration" requirement
became a source of litigation. Departmental interpretations
leaving considerable discretion to the states may be viewed as
resulting either in no requirement at all or in the USDOL
avoiding confrontation with the states. In other instances,
such as the USDOL's interpretation of PRUCOL, what may be
viewed by the USDOL as reasonably effectuating the statute
may be viewed by others as inappropriately restrictive or
intrusive. The primary exceptions to this general pattern of
332. See Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 593 (1937) (stating that
federal requirements exist to assure that a state's unemployment law is one in fact
as well as in name and that lain unemployment law framed in such a way that the
unemployed who look to it will be deprived of reasonable protection is one in name
and nothing more").
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leaving discretion to the states are the deposit and withdrawal
standards, which create absolute limits to state law authority.
The most effective requirements, from the perspective of
federal administration, allow a state to simply establish a spe-
cific criterion in its law.33 Examples include the "double dip"
requirement, where state law simply establishes that work is
necessary to establish a second benefit year, and the EB mone-
tary qualifying requirements, where state law must assure
that there is a specified amount of work, or the equivalent, in
the state's base period. These types of requirements are veri-
fied easily by reviewing state law and result in few conformity
or compliance issues.
Problems arise, however, when federal law creates specific
criteria in areas where reasonable people might disagree. This
is especially the case for eligibility determinations, when
federal law assumes that, given the same set of facts, all
individuals in all states will receive the same determination.
These requirements are difficult for the USDOL to monitor
and, when unanticipated factual situations arise, the states
are left to make determinations on their own. As a result, the
USDOL has sometimes established a broad framework under
which states may operate.
Where there is a need to address a specific matter, the
federal requirement is better framed as a minimum require-
ment rather than as an absolute one. For example, the
"between and within terms denial" provisions could be framed
in such a way that states would have to create provisions
providing for such a denial for individuals expected to return
to educational employment while leaving it to the states to
craft the specific provisions. The educational institutions, its
employees, and the public sector would work jointly to develop
equitable provisions. The USDOL's role would be to assure
that the state law contained some provision addressing be-
tween and within terms situations. This is not unlike the
USDOL's approach for availability provisions for the regular
UC program: states must have them in their laws, but the
states generally determine what constitutes availability with-
out dictation from Washington. Of course, some requirements,
333. HABER & MURRAY, supra note 3, at 446 (emphasizing that specific standards
that are easily verified for conformity purposes will not strain the federal-state
relationship and that, conversely, those standards that are subject to different
interpretations-or for which verifying for compliance is difficult-may strain the
relationship).
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such as the immediate deposit and withdrawal standards,
would be difficult, if not impossible, to frame as minimums:
moneys are either deposited immediately or they are not;
moneys are either withdrawn for the payment of UC or they
are withdrawn improperly. Transforming these requirements
into minimums could lead to entirely meaningless provisions.
If federal legislation is any indicator, it appears that Con-
gress is unlikely to take the approach of using minimum
requirements. In 1935, very few requirements were placed on
the states. When Congress created the double dip and ap-
proved training requirements in 1970, it still gave the states
considerable flexibility. However, the 1970 amendments also
created the between and within terms denial for certain
services, which left the states little flexibility. In 1976, when
requirements were added, the concept of flexibility disap-
peared as' states were required to treat retirement payments
and services performed by aliens in specific ways. Later
amendments added the even more specific EB requirements.
Although it may be difficult to return to a philosophy of trust-
ing the states to work within minimum requirements to
effectuate their purposes, this approach is undoubtedly the
best for the federal-state relationship. This flexibility also
gives states the opportunity to avoid absurd results.
Framing requirements as minimums will not resolve dis-
putes on differing interpretations entirely because not all
federal concerns may lend themselves to requiring the states
simply to address the issue in some fashion in their laws. In
some cases, such as the denial of UC to aliens, there may not
be any public or private sector interest in a state for creating
a meaningful provision of state law. If Congress perceives a
need for such a provision, the test for conformity should be
clear and simple to administer. A clear test for aliens is
whether they had work authorization when the services were
performed. An equally clear but easier to administer test is
merely to require claimants to have work authorization at the
time UC is claimed. The PRUCOL test, by its vagueness,
introduced complexities and invited litigation. Also, any tests
should be based on principles related to UC. For example, the
work authorization tests seem appropriate because, like the
UC program itself, they are inherently related to employment
status. PRUCOL, however, is based on the alien's legal status
in the United States.
FALL 1995-WINTER 1996]
584 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 29:1&2
In the area of conformity, the USDOL regularly raises issues
and requires the states to amend problem laws. In the area of
compliance, however, the record is not impressive. When
conformity issues are resolved, the attendant compliance
issues are rarely resolved. When the issue is performance, for
example, the USDOL has never taken a consistently poorly
performing state to a conformity/compliance hearing. The
result may very well be that some states do not take the
USDOL seriously concerning performance matters.
The USDOL is not always aware of conformity or compliance
issues, and we have seen how the deposit and withdrawal
standards could be circumvented by states paying lip service.
If new requirements are created for the states, they should, if
possible, be fashioned in such a way that merely paying lip
service may not happen. Although it is unlikely that states
would approve of any provision that, in effect, allowed the
USDOL to tell the state what its law means, it is possible to
fashion requirements with which compliance is easily tested.
The "double dip" provision is an example. Its requirement is
so clear that a state could not argue that its law required work
following the beginning of a benefit year without actually
doing so.
No system is immune from problems, and the federal-state
UC system has had its share. At the same time, it has effec-
tively served its primary purpose-the payment of UC to
unemployed individuals. The system will be strengthened if its
limits are accepted and future requirements are fashioned
with knowledge of those limits.
